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Holmes's favorite topic of the language of the law' has been moving
from the back burner to the front burner during the last few years. There
are arguments between interpretivists and noninterpretivists about how
to treat the language of the Constitution2 and there are symposia on "law
and literature. '3 There also are nascent discussions of whether the lan-
guage of the law is a technical language. One scholar has described the
law as being "a language activity," saying what legal scholars have
uniquely to contribute is "our special familiarity with the legal lan-
guage."4 He then found himself accused of having joined the "law as
language movement," which "is aimed principally at reasserting the au-
tonomy of law - at returning law to lawyers by claiming that law is a
specialized language that only lawyers can speak."5
* Professor of Law, Hamline University. B.A., University of Florida 1965;
A.M., University of Illinois 1971; J.D., College of William and Mary 1981; Ph.D.,
University of Illinois 1981. I have been indebted for many years to Fred Schauer
for long hours of conversation about this topic and for his comments on an earlier
draft of this article. All the mistakes, of course, are mine.
1 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920);
see also The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in id. at 203.
2 The dispute is over the extent to which the text of the Constitution is open
or closed. See Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV.
797, n.1 (1982) (citing works of Ely, Brest, Grey, Linde, Monaghan, Perry, and
Richards) [hereinafter Schauer, Essay]. See also Morris, Interpretive and Non-
interpretive Constitutional Theory, 94 ETHICS 501 (1984).
3 See, e.g., Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982);
Symposium: Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981);
Symposium: Law and Literature, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 603 (1979).
4 Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981).
5 Shapiro, On the Regrettable Decline of Law French: Or Shapiro Jettet Le
Brickbat, 90 YALE L.J. 1198, 1200 (1981) (emphasis in original) (commenting on
Stone, supra note 4). One of Professor Shapiro's primary concerns is that Professor
Stone's thesis will encourage persons of less able minds than Professor Stone's
to conclude that legal language belongs only to those trained in the law and will
return us to "the jurisprudence of concepts." Id. at 1200.
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The tone of that criticism suggests that no one can say, in one and the
same breath, that the language of the law is a technical language acces-
sible to all speakers of English, lawyers and laymen alike. Yet, another
scholar has asked for an inquiry into the ways ordinary English and the
language "in legal culture" are related to one another and the ways the
language of the "law must simultaneously function for professionals [who
work] within the legal system and for citizens [who]" live within it.6 He
notes that "legal language, as a technical language, often operates in a
context that makes legal terms have meanings different from those they
bear ' 7 in nonlegal contexts of use; but, he says, "the law speaks largely
if not exclusively in English,"" and "legal English must remain attached
to ordinary English"9 because the former is "parasitic" on the latter.
In this article, I explore some of the truths on each side of the issue of
whether the language of the law is a technical language and whether
lawyers speak in a technical language when they speak with each other
about the law. I try to make sense of saying "lawyers make technical
uses of language" without falling into the dangerously false thesis of
"only lawyers know what the law is because only they speak the language
of the law." For theorists who would like to say the language of the law
is technical, I develop several definitions that allow for such claims. But
I also set out the consequences and limitations of those claims.
In Part I of this article, I examine the due process limitations on the
thesis that the law is in a technical language and I draw distinctions
between speaking carefully and speaking technically. The points I draw
in the latter section are independent of any view we might decide to take
about technical languages and about whether the language of the law is
technical, but they will aid us in avoiding a too-provincial view of the
language of the law. In Part II, I set out the technical language views of
H.L.A. Hart and Charles Caton. By taking back-bearings on the views
of Hart and Caton, I then develop a third view of technical terms. With
that view in hand, I investigate the language of the law in Part III. I
conclude that although Hart's and Caton's views will allow us to say the
language of the law is technical, its technicality is not interesting or
illuminating under these views and is in danger of being an "experts
only" language. Under my view we may not say the language of the law
is technical, although some of the most interesting terms are ones sur-
rounded by theory and although lawyers may speak technically by mak-
ing technical uses of ordinary English. I also explain, however, how a
word that is central to a prescriptive institution sometimes may require
6 Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 586 n.35 (1987) [hereinafter
Schauer, Precedent]. Literally, he notes a dearth of inquiry into the ways "in
which law must simultaneously function for professionals within the legal system
and for citizens outside it .. " (emphasis added), but I take this to be a two-fold
slip of the pen.
Id. (citing Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and "Obscenity": An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979)).
8 Id. at 586.
9 Id. at 586 n.35 (citing C. CATON, PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE
vii-viii (C. Caton ed. 1963)).
[Vol. 37:2
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interpretation that runs slightly ahead of settled ordinary use, and I use
as an example "speech" of the first amendment. In contrast to this phe-
nomenon is the more usual legal phenomenon of terms that have exactly
the same meaning in legal use as they have in ordinary use. My example
here is "promise," and I relate the theory surrounding "speech" to the one
ordinary language itself provides for "promise."
Much of what I will say is obvious; with luck, it also will be, as the
curse goes, interesting. With great good fortune, it will strike a responsive
chord with persons who have wondered about what "thinking like a law-
yer" means10 and who have been concerned by some of the subterranean
undercurrents in recent attacks on the jury system." I will also, however,
be speaking of the meanings of words in ways that, in one sense, some-
times may appear to cut against the "meaning is use" grain of contem-
porary philosophy.'2 Under some formulations of that received view, I
ought not to be speaking of the meanings of words themselves, but of
speakers' uses of words in sentences, 13 or in speech acts, 14 or of speakers'
uses of strings of words to be taken by someone to mean something, 15 and
so on. In short-circuiting to speak of the meanings of words, I sometimes
may be short-changing some of the richness of our linguistic practices.
Even more problematic, however, is my use of "language of": I use the
phrase in a very loose way only moderately abstracted from an identifi-
cation with the linguistic practices of enthusiasts in or participants of a
10 Each fall, as deans welcome first-year students, the phrase "thinking like
a lawyer" wafts from the windows of law schools across the land. Both Professors
Stone and Shapiro view this incantation of "thinking like a lawyer" as an "in-
stitutional conceit." Stone, supra note 4, at 1150; Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1199-
1200, 1204.
But see Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on "Thinking Like a Law-
yer", 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071 (1978) (review of R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977)). He says that, instead of dismissing notions of thinking like a lawyer
as "ritual cant," it should be recognized "as central to the ideology of legal edu-
cation." Id. The phrase implies at least "(1) that there is a particular way lawyers
think; and (2) that this particular way is also a desirable way .... Both of these
propositions are debatable." Id. For example, not all law professors, who teach
budding lawyers to think, themselves think alike, and similarly for judges, who
write the cases these students study. Id. at 1071-73. More importantly, "'thinking
like a lawyer' and 'thinking like a morally acute individual' can cut in radically
different directions." Id. at 1104. Conversely, he argues, in agreement with Pro-
fessor Dworkin, "all citizens in a constitutional democracy have the capacity, and
indeed the right, to engage in legal analysis." Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted).
11 See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (arguing
for lawyers to redeem the promise of the New Deal in part by putting law into
the hands of experts at agencies). But see Schauer, The Role of the People in First
Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761 (1986) (analyzing the current view of
the relationship between jury power and free speech).
12 In another sense, I clearly will not; for nothing I say here fairly could be
taken to be a form of essentialism. That is, I clearly am talking about meanings
of words, not "the" meaning and, indeed, not the meaning.
13 See, e.g., Alston, The Quest for Meaning, 72 MIND 79 (1963).
14 See, e.g., J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969).
15 See, e.g., Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957).
1989]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 273 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
subject, discipline, or activity. What I say, therefore, is more nearly like
an impressionist's charcoal of a landscape than it is a color photograph
or a cartographer's topological map, and I do not wish anyone to be misled
by my unqualified assertional tone. My tone is sometimes misleading in
that I do not finish with any line of argument until I have uncovered and
developed all lines of argument, and each point is subject to critical re-
capitulation and reformulation.
I. LOCAL AND GLOBAL FEATURES OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
A. The Problem: Anti-Reductionism and Reductionism
The bald contention that legal language is a language that only lawyers
can speak is one of several forms of an anti-reductionist thesis. This view
is that legal language differs from English, cannot be reduced to English
- or, at least, cannot be reduced to ordinary English. But the expression
of that view tends to crop up in the contexts of some other point, so that
determining whether a theorist intends to advance an anti-reductionist
view is difficult.
For example, someone may say innocently that "it is a commonplace
that that which gives the language of the law its distinctive flavor is
something other than the King's or the commoner's English.' 6 To say
that the "great mass of the language used by lawyers is ordinary
English"'17 still is innocent because it does not itself indicate a position
with respect to the rest of the language lawyers use. It does not even
necessarily draw a distinction of ordinariness for the "great mass" and
nonordinariness for the rest; for someone may make, as shall I, the great-
mass-ordinariness point to clear-away noncontroversial areas of the lan-
guage of the law in order to facilitate analysis of the rest. With saying
"[o]nly the lawyer can exploit the capabilities of the language of the law,
he alone even recognize[s] some of its limitations," 8 however, the inno-
cence begins to fade; and it pales entirely in the rhetorical excess of a
statement that "the language of the law depends for survival upon those
it unites in priesthood - the lawyers."'1 For here we arrive at the bud
of a claim that there is something lawyers know about the language of
the law and do with it that nonlawyers do not do exactly because non-
lawyers are nonlawyers. Even then, determining whether the theorist
intends to convey an anti-reductionist message is difficult. 20
16 D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 10 (1963).
1Id. at 9.
18 Id. at 454.
'9 Id. at 453.
20 The last of Professor Mellinkoffs remarks quoted in the text, for example,
itself is in the context of his saying, "Law language is no longer - as lawyers
once wanted it - bottled in bond, that their discipline might not be made common
among the vulgar." Id. at 453.
[Vol. 37:2
HeinOnline  -- 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 274 1989
EXCURSIONS INTO LEGAL LANGUAGE
On the other side of the coin, what are we to think when someone
compares learning the language of the law to learning a foreign language
and says that "it is useful to treat common-law mens rea terms, and
indeed much of the language of the law, as words that must be translated
into ordinary language before one can learn what they mean and how to
use them"?2 That sort of statement certainly is not anti-reductionist, but
just how innocent is it? It suggests that the legal language can be reduced
to English, but only in translation, and that in turn is to deny that the
language of the law is already part of English. It also does not tell us
whether the result of the translation leaves any cognitive dissonance
between the original law and the English translation. Are there any
shades of the Innuit's distinctions among snows left over, any niches in
the German's gemutliche Ecke left unilluminated, and so on? That is, are
there any translation failures, and do lawyers come to see things differ-
ently than nonlawyers? If not, why? Nor does the view suggest how a
translation failure is possible, given that men and women make the law.
More pointedly, if law students need to carry around a translation manual
until they have learned the foreign words of the language of the law, are
all the commentators who argue that Shakespeare may have been a
lawyer themselves lawyers, and did all his playgoers go to law school, or
did they sit mutely in the audience not understanding some of the words
and phrases of his plays?
22
A dispute about the nature of legal language is not unique to juris-
prudence. Philosophers and mathematicians long have argued about
whether mathematical propositions are reducible to empirical generali-
zations (for example, "2 + 2 = 4" to propositions about counting objects)
or to symbol-manipulation rules ("2 + 2 = 4" to propositions about the
conventional uses educated people make of certain symbols) or are not
reducible at all because they are sui generis, in a language unique unto
itself and cut off from other languages. One philosopher, who character-
ized the former two views as "radical" and the latter view as "conserv-
ative," argued that the conservative view that mathematical propositions
are sui generis is "perfectly correct, but rather unsatisfactory and unil-
luminating, whereas opinions of the 'radical' type are untrue, but inter-
esting and illuminating.'" 23 The theory I ultimately will be presenting is
of the radical kind. My thesis is that statements of our law and the central,
substantive legal words, rather than being sui generis, are ordinary Eng-
lish, albeit perhaps not always in the ordinary language sense in which
J.L. Austin and others may speak of ordinary language. 24 This thesis thus
21 P. Low, J. JEFFERIES, JR., & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 198 (2d ed. 1986).
12 To be sure, the commentators argue not only on the basis of Shakespeare's
adept usages of legal terms and legal maxims, but also his apparently autobio-
graphical remarks - such as "I am a wise fellow, and one that knows the law"
from Much Ado About Nothing, act iv, scene 2 - to fill some otherwise unac-
counted years in his life. See W. KNIGHT, SHAKESPEARE'S HIDDEN LIFE: SHAKE-
SPEARE AT THE LAW 1585-95 (1973); W. RUSHTON, SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL MAXIMS
9, 60-61 (1907; 1973); F. HEARD, SHAKESPEARE AS A LAWYER 7, 10-11, 13 (1883;
1977).
23Gasking, Mathematics and the World (1940), reprinted in LOGIC AND LAN-
GUAGE (First and Second Series) 204 (A. Flew ed. (1965)).
2ASee, e.g., J. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
1989]
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is more radical than even the radical thesis that legal language can be
reduced to English, because the thesis is that the law already is in Eng-
lish, and my view, therefore, runs even greater risk of being "untrue."
Examples of views that take a fully conscious position on the nature
of legal language are hard to find, and this is no less true of anti-reduc-
tionism (or reductionism or translationism). With two notable exceptions,
few scholars have paid attention to the nature of legal language. 25 One
of the notable exceptions is legal theorist H.L.A. Hart; and the other is
philosopher Charles Caton, who practices analytic philosophy within the
ordinary language tradition. Caton's view is that the language of the law
is a technical language that, like all technical languages, is an "adjunct"
of or "parasitic" on ordinary languages such as ordinary English or or-
dinary French.26 Caton's view is not anti-reductionist although the rea-
sons it is not are complex. Hart's view, however, is anti-reductionist. That
Hart is an anti-reductionist comes as no surprise to students of his works
in one sense, for he rejected the view that legal concepts and rules can
be reduced to moral and political concepts and rules.27 Yet Hart is an
anti-reductionist about the language of the law although he also practices
analytical jurisprudence within a tradition of ordinary language philos-
ophy.2
8
This disagreement between two scholars who practice within the same
tradition alone is enough to make the thesis that the language of the law
may not be reduced to English worth investigating. There is another
reason that is even more compelling, however, and it is that the anti-
reductionist thesis is false.
B. The Due Process Limits for Anti-Reductionism
One of the basic propositions of Anglo-American law is that each in-
dividual will be accorded due process of law, or due process under the
law. As part of that enforming proposition, we presume each person knows
the law. This, of course, is a myth, if we take "each person knows the
law" to mean each person does know the law. That is, it is empirically
false. When we say the law presumes each person knows the law, we do
not even mean each person is able to know the law, with or without the
25 There are exceptions, all of which build within and on the tradition begun
by J. AUSTIN, supra note 24, in which Austin gives an extensive examination of
"promise" and promising. See, e.g., Hancher, Speech Acts and the Law in LAN-
GUAGE USE AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 245 (R. Shuy & A. Shnukal eds. 1980);
Samek, Performative Utterances and the Concept of Contract, 43 AUSTRALASIANJ. PHIL. 196 (1965); Comment, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech
Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1986).2
, C. CATON, PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE V, viii (C. Caton ed. 1963).
See also section II B, infra, for full discussion of his views. The description of the
relationship of technical language to ordinary language as "parasitic" comes from
Schauer, Precedent, supra note 6, at 586 n.35.
27 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). See also N. MAC-
CORMICK, H.L.A. HART 20-28 (1981).
28 N. MACCORMICK, supra note 27, at 12-19.
[Vol. 37:2
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weasel "ceteris paribus." We may try to say that what we mean is some-
thing more nearly like the proposition that there are no surprises in the
law, that the law fits within standards of behavior and general moral
precepts members of society recognize; but that will not do either. We
must give up the empiricist and dispositional claims for the presump-
tion. 2
9
When we say the law presumes - that is, we presume - each person
knows the law, we are setting the limits of the law and setting a pre-
scriptive standard for the law to meet for both law-making and law-
enforcing. We are constructing a myth30 not in the sense of falsity, but
in the sense of a story that is part of the fabric of our lives and of our
society and that we are to give solid reality, although there never will
be a universal empirical truth in "each person knows the law." And we
have made a good start, after centuries of different practice, in giving it
reality by establishing legal aid societies, by understanding the Consti-
tution to require that poor persons accused of crime have a lawyer, and
so on. We have more solid reality than these recent developments on
which to rely, however; and that reality is solid because the myth is a
truth. It is the truth that the law is ours, not lawyers', and is in our
tongue, not in argot. We mark this truth in due process clauses although
the truth hinges into a deeper sense of due process than merely those
clauses. And we enforce due process requirements that the law be in our
language and be ours. If only lawyers could "speak the law," then only
lawyers could be prosecuted for crimes or held in contempt or sued in tort
or held to administrative regulations.
In criminal law, our legal system imposes due process limitations
against the law's not being comprehensible to ordinary persons. No one
may be convicted of a crime absent fair notice that the act is punishable.
The Supreme Court, under the "principle of criminal law" that only stat-
utory offenses are punishable, has established that there are no federal
29 This presumption is one of the many presumptions or constituting-prop-
ositions through which the law increasingly has become "objectivized" over the
centuries but particularly since around the time of the industrial revolution,
although forms of this particular presumption have a more ancient history in
criminal law. All of these objectivizations of the law probably are related to
controlling juries, to dealing with an increasingly complex and large society, and
to the rise of the middle class, who came to court in ever increasing numbers as
the ranks of lawyers also swelled. Consider, as just one example, the objectivi-
zational shift in English law that came with Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (limiting contract damages to those that are foreseeable
because they naturally or usually arise from breaches of this type of contract and
those that are foreseeable because, although they are unusual, they were within
the contemplation of the parties at the contracting) compared to Black v. Bax-
endale, 1 Exch. 410 (1847) (allowing the jury to award "reasonable" contract
damages); and think of the ways that Hadley has been further objectivized today.
30 This myth, then, is part of our narrative and sets a range of meaning for
legal discourse. See generally Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4
(1983); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 415 (1982).
19891
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common law crimes. 31 Most states agree.3 2 Even those states that purport
to recognize common law crimes mean only that crimes existing at com-
mon law continue to exist without specific individual positive enact-
ment.3 They do not mean that courts may create brand new felonies out
of whole cloth;34 and, were a court to claim the power to do so, it would
run afoul of the constitutional requirement of due process. 35
The due process requirement for criminal law is thus two-fold at one
level. There must be notice that the act is prohibited and is punishable,
for which shared notions of blameworthiness are not sufficient.3 6 At an-
other level, due process requires that the people be the source of the
criminal law. The former requirement entails the language of the criminal
law be in a language that is comprehensible to the people to whom it
applies, and the latter requirement ensures the satisfaction of the former.
The fair notice due process criminal cases are replete with arguments
about whether the criminal statute is in words and phrases that long
" United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1892); United States v.Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). As will become clear in this section, I am infundamental and abiding disagreement with statements such as: "As an originalproposition, United States v. Hudson and Goodwin was probably wrong.... But
the proposition is too well settled now for argument." W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 9, at 60 n.17 (1972) (citing 1923 and 1933 law review articles
and notes).
32 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1-4 (1982); State v. Bowling, 5 Ariz. App. 436,427 P.2d 920 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.1-3 (1961); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3102 (1984 Supp.); State v. Heymann, 256 La. 18, 235 So. 2d 78 (1970);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.015 (West 1987); Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383 (1884);18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107 (Purdon 1973); Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.01 (West 1988). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.05(1) (1962).
" See, e.g., State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); Pope v. State, 38 Md.App. 520, 382 A.2d 880 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68 (1847);N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-3 (1984). See also United States v. Davis, 167 F.2d 228(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
14 Authorities continue to insist that:in the absence of statute [depriving courts of the power to create new crimes,
a] majority of jurisdictions still recognize the power of courts to create commonlaw crimes... [although] [tihe trend today is in the direction of abolishing such
crimes, so that conduct not forbidden and punished by a statute is not a crime.W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 31, § 9, at 57. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 37-38 (3d ed. 1982).35 U.S. CONsT. amend. V, amend. XIV § 1. Arguments to the contrary arebased on cases decrepit with age. See, e.g., the dates of the cases cited in W.LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 31, at 66 nn.66-67. Moreover, the argumentsignore that ours is a legislative age and that our view of constitutional due process
has broadened and deepened in the last 200 years.
36 There must be a statute that declares the prohibition, in terms that meet
conditions I will discuss in the text following this note, and that sets the penalty.See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) (federal statute prohibited
concealing an alien, but did not create a crime because the penalty prescribed
was too vague); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 73 A.2d 705 (1950)(statute prohibited driving overweight trucks, defined "overweight" four waysbut set penalty for only one; the other three are not crimes). But see State v.Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d 858 (1947) (treating statutorily prohibited conductfor which there was no statutory penalty as a misdemeanor).
[Vol. 37:2
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have been in use among speakers of English, or whether an ordinary-
English speaker would understand the words in the statute to have the
particular meaning in question. Consider Rose v. Locke,37 in which the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction for cunnilingus under a "crime
against nature" statute on grounds that due process requires only that
"the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as
to avoid that which is forbidden. '38 That requirement was met in Rose,
the Court said, because "crime against nature" "has been in use among
English-speaking people for many centuries," with a meaning anyone
could determine, in a state in which the highest state court nearly twenty
years earlier had rejected a contention that "crime against nature" did
not include fellatio.3 9 Now, Rose is perhaps the most difficult case on many
levels for a claim that criminal statutes are valid under the due process
clause only if the meaning is within the common understanding of the
words of the statute. Critics could charge, of course, that the Rose Court
twisted the history of the common law because centuries ago "crime
against nature" covered only bestiality and sodomy, with the latter taken
in its narrowest sense of penis-anus sexual acts between human beings,
i.e., buggery.40
The relevance of the earlier state case then was two-fold: First, it took
the broader view of "sodomy" as including penis-mouth sexual acts,
thereby breaking the connection of "crimes against nature" to its most
conservatively narrow possible historical meaning by saying an anus is
not necessary to a sodomous act, i.e., that it includes fellatio. This in turn
made possible and foreseeable the further interpretation of "sodomy" as
including sexual acts in which a penis is not involved, i.e., that it includes
cunnilingus; and the defendant therefore had notice that satisfies due
process. Second, the earlier case was relevant because the defendant was
giving a narrow linguistic attack on the interpretation of the statute as
applying to him on the basis of citations to common law cases and com-
mentary. To the latter, the Court's due process reply essentially is, "Cite
cases to us, and we'll cite cases right back to you." That is, a defendant
cannot have things both ways in a due process argument about the mean-
ing of a statute. He or she cannot pick and choose among meanings when
all of them are available meanings under common usage and decided
cases or are natural rationalizations and implications of common usage
or decided cases.
That point in turn takes us back to the first reason the earlier case
was relevant on the issue of due process notice. There always are natural
extensions of one case to the next by way of "theory-construction" that
rests in the nature of language itself, and perhaps particularly in the
English language, and that is compounded in the nature ofjudicial review
on the basis of precedent. Language is elastic, i.e., open textured, and
this especially is true of English in part because English often has more
than one word for a thing. With "sodomy," for example, the English word
17 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
38 Id. at 50.
39 1d. at 50, 52.
40 See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 34, at 465-69.
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was and is both the generic word and the particular-act word. Even when
words start out their lives as particular-instance words, they can become
generic over time through the common use of the words by speakers' not
marking distinctions because these distinctions do not matter to the
speakers most of the time. In the absence of a court's clearly limiting a
particular-instance word to its particular-instance meaning, a word that
hovers on the edge of being a generic word may in the next case be applied
on the generic basis rather than on the particular-instance basis. 41 This
is especially likely to happen to men who enter next-door neighbors'
apartments by pretext and wield butcher knives to force sexual relations
with their unwilling neighbors, even if the acts are cunnilingus and the
state's cases heretofore have dealt with sodomy and fellatio in the nar-
rowest sense and have held both of the latter to be covered by the meaning
of "crime against nature" but never have rejected coverage of cunnilin-
gus.42
The interesting due process question thus is not the one in Rose itself,
but in the earlier state case or, rather, the first case to have departed
from the narrowest meaning of "sodomy" and hence of "crime against
nature." Assuming arguendo that when sodomy became an English crime
after the demise of ecclesiastic courts,43 the extant sodomy convictions
were for only penis-anus sexual acts between human beings, was the first
person convicted under a sodomy statute or crime-against-nature statute
for having engaged in fellatio afforded due process? 44 There would be
legitimate grounds for arguing for the court to take a narrow view. If a
court were to refuse the prosecution on grounds of denial of due process,
the court would slow the elastic development of the word "sodomy" or
phrase "crime against nature" for a time, perhaps forever. In that event,
forces in society, were the need sufficient, would find a way around by
stretching some other word or by changing the statute.
Whether this conservatism was a necessity in the first nonnarrow so-
domy prosecution is none too certain, however. After all, the ecclesiastic
wrong could be equally and legitimately viewed as any nonprocreative
sexual act, not merely penis-anus sodomy. If, then, a defendant were to
object to being prosecuted under the crime-against-nature statute on the
ground that his sexual act did not involve sodomy in its narrowest sense,
but involved fellatio, a court could reject that argument and, if the ec-
clesiastic understanding were within the collective recent memory of the
populace, probably would reject it.
The brutal fact of the matter is that crime-against-nature statutes had
and have been vehicles for prosecuting homosexuals. In one sense, then,
41 See generally-Schauer, Precedent, supra note 6. See also Morrison, Choice
of Law for Unlawful earches, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 579 (1988).
42 See, e.g., Rose'e. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 48-49 (1975).
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 34, at 466.
Nothing turns, here, on my using fellatio as the first case; it equally could
have been cunnilingus. I am assuming, however, that the statutory terms are
"sodomy" (or "sodomy and bestiality") or "crime against nature" and not "buggery
and bestiality."
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the defendant's argument basically would be an appeal to the court to
limit "crime against nature" or "sodomy" to homosexual acts. As an ar-
gument about the public's common understanding of "crime against na-
ture" or "perverse sexual act" or "sodomy," this argument would be well-
taken in the sense that this limited-to-homosexuals meaning probably
once was and still might be the common understanding. Cast in this light,
however, the common-understanding argument is hoist by its own petard
equally with an argument that cites some but not all cases and law that
are arguably and equally on point. Ecclesiastic courts, not constrained
by notions of either due process or equal justice for all, can get away with
viewing "crime against nature" as applying only to homosexual acts on
grounds that homosexuality is an abomination in the eyes of God. When
the people's courts take over interpretation of "crime against nature,"
however, the court cannot interpret general words of a statute to save
them from a common-understanding due process challenge by imposing
a narrowing construction that makes the clause violate basic notions of
equal protection of the laws. (Or so any reasonable person would have
believed until Bowers v. Hardwick,45 which may be every bit as dreadful
a decision as the one that took a Civil War to overturn.)
46
Other fair notice due process cases provide easier lessons than the
message in Rose because their lessons are more on the surface of the
decisions. Thus, in McBoyle v. United States,47 Justice Holmes noted that
although a criminal is unlikely to consider "the text of the law before he
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given
to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."48 A criminal statute that
defines "motor vehicle" as "an automobile. . . truck ... wagon, motorcycle,
or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" does
not cover an aircraft, although an aircraft is self-propelled, is a vehicle,
4 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Hardwick, of course, was a due process case of a
different sort, namely privacy due process. But a full understanding of that kind
of privacy links privacy to the source-of-the-law point I made earlier in the text
about due process because, on one view, at that level the question is whether, in
agreeing to be governed under law, the minority agreed that the majority may
outlaw the minority's morally respectable views by taking a narrower view on
moral grounds. See, e.g., Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L
REV. 269 (1975) (interventions of courts during periods of moral flux allows new
consensus to form); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1973) ("some types of choices ought to be
remanded, on principle, to private decision-makers unchecked by substantive
governmental control"). For a slightly different account of privacy due process,
see Morrison, Constitutional Reasoning for Rights, 54 Mo. L_ REV. 29 (1989).
46Hardwick merely shows what we have known all along. First, we cannot
limit our notions of due process or justice to what any court is willing to dispense
because courts do not have a monopoly on perceptions of justice. They are not
constituted of Plato's philosopher kings. Moreover, the justice they are to dispense
is ours, not theirs, where "our justice" paradoxically is both majoritarian and
nonmajoritarian. Finally, persecuted minorities in the long run are better off
having their persecution out of the closet so that we all may do battle with devils
in daylight rather than box at shadows who hide in the darkness of night.
47 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (Holmes, J.).
48 Id. at 27.
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and is not designed to run on rails.49 "[I]n everyday speech, 'vehicle' calls
up the popular picture of a thing moving on land," and the "theme" of
the statutory definition here was of "a vehicle that runs, not something,
not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. '50
Although the individual words must be comprehensible to the persons
to whom they apply, these words do not always have to be comprehensible
to all English speakers. There is no due process impropriety in using
"trade" words in a statute that applies only to persons who know the
meanings of those words. New York meat dealers, for example, are not
deprived of proper notice by a statute that prohibits them from falsely
representing nonkosher meat as kosher when the dealers sell both kinds
of meat. Similarly, sheepherders have proper notice when a statute pro-
hibits them from grazing sheep on a "cattle range" in an area in which
there are both sheep ranchers and cattle ranchers.51 Further, a law is not
unconstitutionally vague simply because it throws upon people the risk
of "estimating rightly . . . some matter of degree. '52 Yet when the law
fails to indicate what normative standard people must meet, the law fails
to give due process notice even if the statute consists of simple words
even children know, such as a prohibition against "annoying" others on
a sidewalk.53
Thus criminal statutes must give fair warning to all those to whom
the statutes apply. The more universal the class, the more nonspecialized
the language of the statute must be. But the statute cannot be so inexact
and general that each person must guess as to its meaning because each
of us legitimately could construe the words in significantly different nor-
mative ways.
This due process standard also is the theme of the criminal and civil
contempt due process cases. No defendant can be held in contempt of an
order stated in terms that are not comprehensible to her. Enjoined de-
491 Id. at 26.
5 Id.51 Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 498-502 (1925) (Suth-
erland, J.). Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 345 n.3, 348 (1918) (Brandeis,
J.). See also Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926)
(Sutherland, J.). Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 452-55, 458 (1939)(Butler, J.) ("gangster" and "gang" had no common law meanings and have varied
dictionary and scholarly meanings). Notice, then, that a criminal statute written
in technical legal terms would be enforceable under Hygrade against all and only
lawyers or persons who happened to know these technical legal terms. To a certain
extent the same would be true, then, for civil actions and for administrative
regulations, hence the statement in the text at the beginning of this section. See
also text following note 58, infra.
52 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (Holmes, J.) ("undue
restraint of trade" in Sherman Act). Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 216, 219, 221-23 (1914) (Holmes, J.) ("real market value" for manufac-
turers in a market already disrupted by lawful combinations of farmers).
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 n.1, 614 (1971) ("men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning"); cf. Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104, 108-11 (1972) (similar sidewalk statute upheld when it had
been construed by state courts as not prohibiting the lawful exercise of consti-
tutional rights).
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fendants, as Justice Holmes has said, "ought to be informed as accurately
as the case permits what they are forbidden to do."54 The "paramount
interests of liberty and due process make it indispensable for the chan-
cellor ... to speak clearly, explicitly, and specifically . . . . 5 This is be-
cause of the risks of both civil and criminal contempt proceedings, namely
that the contemnor may be sent to jail or be fined. Federal orders, for
example, must set forth the reasons for issuance, be specific in terms, and
describe the act to be enjoined in reasonable detail in the order itself,
rather than by cross reference to, or incorporation of, some other docu-
ment.56 The standard of comprehensibility and completeness is not
whether the judge who wrote the order understands it, nor whether law-
yers would understand it. The proto-typical ordinary person for these
contempt cases is a person who is not trained in the law:
[T]he language of the injunction should in all cases be so clear
and explicit that an unlearned man can understand its mean-
ing, without the necessity of employing counsel to advise him
what he has a right to do to save him from subjecting himself
to punishment for a breach of injunction.5 7
The same general theme runs through our civil common law, but here
the connection between the law and its language is less obvious and the
connection between the ordinary person and her knowledge of the law is
more obvious. Because of this difference in obviousness with respect to
our common law of torts, contracts, restitution, and so on, we might be
inclined to say there essentially is no due process bar to having these
areas of the law "conducted" in some other language that one learns only
by going to law school. For, aside from a pro se limitation, which requires
only that anyone be allowed to represent herself in court,58 we might
believe we could say that ultimately the only limitation on private law
4 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401 (1905) (Holmes, J.).
5' H.K. Porter Co. v. National Friction Products, 568 F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir.
1977).
56 FED. R. CIrv. P. 65(d). State procedural rules are similar.
57 Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige ch. 234 (1841) (Walworth, C.) (ex parte order in
a separation suit, enjoining the husband from "annoying, following," etc., his wife
or children; modified after he was charged with contempt for sending her an
annoying letter).
5 Adult natural persons have a common law right to appear personally or
by counsel. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 828 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.); Hightower v. Hawthorn, 12 F. Cas. 142 (Super. Ct. Ark. 1826) (No. 6,478b).
This right is an alternative one. Talbot v. Talbot's Representatives, 25 Ky. (2 J.J.
Marsh.) 3, 4 (1829). It is distinct from the privilege of practicing law, i.e., from
the privilege of appearing on behalf of others, which privilege is limited by statute
to active members of the bar. Gray v. Justice's Court of Williams Judicial Town-
ship, 18 Cal. App. 2d 420, 63 P.2d 1160 (1937). The right to proceed pro se or in
propria persona partly is a consequence of the liability to be sued, Werckman v.
Werckman, 4 Civ. Proc. Rep. 146, 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883); and, in criminal cases,
is a right guaranteed by the sixth amendment, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819, 821-36, 834-35 n.46 (1975). The pro se right often today is codified. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R § 321(a) (McKinney Supp.
1983).
1989]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 283 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
is that the principles of the law be in, so to speak, "English concepts."
That is, someone could believe that, theoretically, the statements of the
rules of law in civil statutes and in civil cases could be in any language
whatever, including a language that all and only lawyers speak when
they are speaking qua lawyers, as long as the rules thusly stated con-
tained no surprises in terms of normative standards for tortfeasors, tort
plaintiffs, contracting parties, etc., once these people come to court.5 9
This view, however, is founded on two mistakes. First, if the pro se
limitation has any real meaning as a limitation on the law, the person
who must be allowed to represent herself must not be met with an inex-
orable "catch 22" when she exercises her right. That is, she must not be
told that she may represent herself without a lawyer, only to find that
she herself must be a lawyer to represent herself. Second, and vastly more
important, there is no such thing as an "English concept" that cannot be
embodied in the English language. Were we to say that the only ultimate
limitation on private law is that the principles of that law must comport
with our shared understandings of proper conduct, and thus with our
"shared concepts," so that ordinary persons not trained in the law are not
met with surprise when they come to court, we would be advancing a
thesis that contravenes what gives the law both its origin and its con-
tinuing-existence legitimacy, namely ourselves. Of course, the civil com-
mon law is grounded in the fabric of our daily lives - shared values,
problems, distinctions, and solutions. But that truth cannot be turned
upon its head to justify using some language other than the language of
our daily lives for the language of the law.
The only reasons to try to use some language in the law other than the
ordinary language of the people are to generate income for lawyers or to
enhance the mystery of the law, much as Latin came to enhance the
mystery of the Trinity. To say the language of the law is one only lawyers
can understand because it is a technical language is to cloak ourselves
in the modern mystique of the sciences, much as we once may have cloaked
ourselves in each of the twin images of Stendal's The Red and the Black
by our descriptions of ourselves as "champions of justice."
Thus our shift from French Law was, in a sense, one of our greatest
democratic revolutions because it made statements of the law accessible
to us, even if we are not lawyers. That revolution further is built into
our legal system through the right to trial by jury made up of ordinary
men and women.60 Each accused and each defendant is entitled to be held
59 But the political clout of Parti Quebecois is not the explanation for the
facts that French and English are the official languages of Canada; that statutes,
records, and journals of Canada's Parliament are required to be in both French
and English; and that either French or English may be used in courts established
by Parliament. Canada, Constitution Act, Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
dom, § 16-20 (1982).
60 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (all criminal trials), amend. VII (federal trials at
law). State constitutions have similar guarantees. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art I, § 8
(criminal trials), § 11 (civil trials).
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responsible in accordance with the law;6 1 and, unless the men and women
who decide the pivotal issues in criminal and civil cases have been in-
structed in terms that are comprehensible to them, we cannot be certain
the jurors have decided in accordance with the law. Instructions are to
guide the jurors in their decisionmaking, and instructions that require a
law degree to understand simply fail to guide laypersons.
6 2 Jury instruc-
tions necessarily are supposed to be in English, not in some language
only lawyers understand, and are not to be replete with legal jargon or
"legal niceties."
Our legal system simply does not operate under an assumption that
each person has a lawyer on retainer to translate the law into English.
63
Rather, we can engage in and live the myth that each person knows the
law because it is in English, whether statute or common law rule.
For the judiciary, then, to say to the sovereign that only judges know
what the law is, is one thing. When Coke addressed the King, the issue
61 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106-07, 113 (1945) (question of intent
not submitted to jury with proper instructions; noted sua sponte and new trial
ordered because error was fundamental: "Even those guilty of the most heinous
offenses are entitled to a fair trial"); Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408
F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Brien v. Willys Motors, Inc., 385 F.2d 163 (6th Cir.
1967) (error in placing burden).
62 Jury instructions "couched in such lawyerly cant as 'prima facie case' and
'shifting the burden of proof,' would only... confuse [ I the jury" and are properly
refused by the court. Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 85 (2nd Cir.
1983). An instruction ought to be tailored to the jurors' common sense and give
them adequate guidance. Id. at 85-86. See also Rangel v. Badolato, 133 Cal. App.
2d 254, 284 P.2d 138 (1955); Wekman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418,
428-31, 218 P.2d 43 (1950) (concurring opinion).
For arguments based on the fact that, for example, even nonlawyer Pres-
idents are sworn to uphold the law and must then have a duty and ability to
interpret the law, see P. BREST, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 15-
44 (1975); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 27 STAN. L REV. 585 (1975). On the right and duty of citizens to interpret
the Constitution, see Levinson, supra note 10, at 1074 n.12, 1101-04. The role
the people play as the source of law may be uniquely American on the northern
part of this continent in the most ultimate form of that role. We long have thought
of ourselves as being the source of our Constitution and the powers of our gov-
ernment. U.S. CONST. preamble ("We the People ... do ordain and establish this
Constitution .... "); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) (the people, not the states, adopted the Constitution and created the
federal government). See also U.S. CONST. art. V (allowing for amendment to the
Constitution by constitutional conventions). Compare Canada, Constitution Act
1982, Part V (allowing for amendments only by resolutions of the Senate and
House of Commons and of two-thirds of the provincial legislatures having at least
fifty percent of the population, etc. and providing certain matters - e.g. the
French/English requirement and composition of Supreme Court of Canada - may
be amended only by unanimous agreement of Senate, House of Commons, and
all provincial legislatures).
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was an institutional conflict, a dispute about balance of power.64 For the
judiciary to say this to a man in the docket or to a woman sued in tort
is quite another. When a court officer told Penn that Penn could not
understand the common law because he had not spent a lifetime studying
law,65 the heart of the court's message was an "expert's only" message, a
message that only lawyers know the law and only lawyers speak the law.
Coke may have intended that same message; but if he did, he was no less
misguided and false-speaking than was the court officer who addressed
Penn. For the law is ours, yours, theirs and mine, whatever our station
in life and whatever our training. This principle has been a formal part
of our Anglo-American legal tradition since at least 1215 A.D., when our
noble ancestors met King John under the trees at Runnymede, and was
renewed in 1791, when the fifth, sixth, and seventh amendments became
part of our Constitution and renewed again with the passage of the four-
teenth amendment.
The bald contention that only lawyers speak the law, or that the law
is in a language only lawyers can speak, is false - patently, historically,
legally, and dangerously false. There is no question of whether legal
language can be reduced to English because the law already is in English.
Is there, then, no truth in some form of the "expert's only" thesis? The
answer is, there is some truth. There is something distinctive about how
lawyers speak, although this feature is not distinctive to only legal lan-
guage; and there is something distinctive about the meanings of some
r4 It was a dispute about whether common law courts were interfering with
ecclesiastic courts. James inclined to side with the archbishop and claimed the
right to decide to which court cases should go.
Then (this is Coke's account) the king said that he thought the law was founded
upon reason, and that he and others had reason as well as the judges. To which
it was answered by me that true it was that God had allowed His Majesty
excellent science and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not
learned in the law of his realm of England and causes which concern the life
or inheritance or goods or fortunes of his subjects; they are not to be decided
by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law
is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain
to the cognizance of it; and that the law was the golden met-wand and measure
to try the causes of the subjects, and which protected His Majesty in safety and
peace. With which the king was greatly offended, and said that then he should
be under the law, which was treason to affirm, as he said. To which I said that
Bracton saith quod Rex non debet esse sub homine set sub deo et lege.
F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 268-69 (1913) (citing
Coke, Reports, XII, 65).
65William Penn and William Mead were indicted for causing a tumultuous
assembly. Penn demanded to know upon what ground they were indicted and the
Recorder, a court official, replied "Upon the common-law."
Penn. Where is that common-law?
Rec. You must not think that I am able to run up so many years, and over
so many adjudged cases, which we call common-law, to answer your curiosity.
Penn.... if it be common, it should not be so hard to produce.
***
Rec. You are an impertinent fellow, will you teach the court what law is? It
is Lex non scripta, that which many have studied 30 or 40 years to know, and
would you have me to tell you in a moment?
Trial of Penn, 6 How. ST. TRIALS 951, 958-59 (1670) (report written by Penn and
Mead).
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"legal" words although this distinctive feature falls short of turning the
language of the law into a technical language that only lawyers speak
and falls short of being unique to legal language.
C. Speaking Carefully and Speaking Technically
Lawyers who speak carefully draw distinctions between "verdict" and
"judgment," "accused" and "defendant," "plaintiff' and "libelant," "sum-
mons" and "subpoena in chancery." In this, lawyers do not essentially
differ from painters who distinguish between "China black" and "lamp-
black," or from stockmen who chuckle at hearing a steer called a "cow,"
or from kennelwomen who do not use the word "dog" to describe a puppy
even if the puppy is a male. In each of these latter cases the speakers
mark a preference for one of several ordinary English meanings of a word.
Independent of whether "accused" and "defendant" are ordinary English
words or are technical legal words of a different order, lawyers also are
marking a preference among ranges of meanings when they call persons
sued civilly "defendants" but persons sued criminally "accuseds."
This preference-among-meanings phenomenon is a function of a more
narrowly focused interest than usually shows up in ordinary conversation,
and it sometimes inhibits ordinary conversation. Speaking with a colorist,
whether a painter or a paint seller, about color, for example, can be a
painful experience because the colorist can divide and redivide blues from
blues and reds from reds, with words for each. Not everyone knows the
variety of words for individual colors, and some people simply cannot
visually distinguish between certain shades of red-orange and red. Con-
stant reminders from a colorist to a neophyte that the name of this blue
is "Persian turquoise" but the name of that one is "American turquoise,"
especially when a number of other words for other shades of blue have
cropped up in the conversation, eventually leads one of the conversation-
alists to pique or to despair. This especially is true when the neophyte
merely wanted to buy some paint for the den - she is not always inter-
ested in noticing nice distinctions between very near shades of turquoise,
let alone between the words for these shades. (Even colorists speaking
among themselves find using "this" and "that," together with numbered
paint chips, easier and more accurate than using names for the colors.)
Conversations between lawyers and laypersons are subject to the same
difficulties, for the same reasons, as those between the colorist and the
neophyte. In neither kind of conversation need anyone be speaking a
technical language and in each, usually, the conversationalists strike
some balance about how fine-tuned they will make their use of "plaintiff"
or "turquoise," and so on. The question here may be only how much or
how little jargon or "trade talk" the conversationalists can endure. The
potential jargon level of the average lawyer's conversations qua lawyer,
however, is not what makes talking to lawyers painful for ordinary des-
ultory conversationalists.
The painfulness of talking with lawyers rests on something else. Even
lawyers who considerately eschew legal terms in speaking with layper-
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sons make those persons uneasy because (good) lawyers speak carefully,
listen well, and ask questions. Careful speakers say what they mean and
mean what they say. They are aware of their speech and of the speech of
others. They know, for example, the difference between what a person
knows and what she merely believes, and they recognize when a person
implies knowledge in her speech and how to probe linguistically to de-
termine whether she intends to claim knowledge or merely is being care-
less or colloquial in her speech in expressing belief. Careful speakers
similarly hear the difference between "Only rollerskaters may use these
lanes" and "Rollerskaters may use only these lanes," and they are apt to
query the speaker to discover whether the speaker means what she says
and says what she means - or, indeed what she means if she says,
"Rollerskaters may only use these lanes."
The painfulness of talking to lawyers rests on their being careful speak-
ers in this say-mean/mean-say sense and on their being apt and able to
be careful speakers at all times in all conversations with all persons about
all subjects. This is not something unique to lawyers. Any moderately
educated speaker of ordinary English (or German or Swahili) can be a
say-mean/mean-say careful speaker. Nor are only lawyers systematically
trained to be such careful speakers or regularly and pervasively inclined
to be such careful speakers. Philosophers, perhaps particularly those who
work in the contemporary analytic tradition, similarly are systematically
trained to be, and are inclined pervasively to be, careful say-mean/mean-
say speakers. There are, of course, a great many more lawyers than there
are philosophers in our society, and few philosophically trained people
become lawyers. Perhaps this accounts for our particularly noticing law-
yers' speech abilities and proclivities. If we are to make any headway in
analyzing the "language of the law," however, we need to remember not
to take a provincial view of the (good) lawyer's mastery of the tools readily
at hand to any thoughtful and careful person through careful uses of an
ordinary language. Some bricklayers are more careful speakers of English
than are some lawyers, who consequently are poor lawyers.
Sometimes, bricklayers, lawyers, and the rest of us make technical uses
of language. Our speaking technically in this sense makes us particular
instances of careful speakers. A technical use of language is the issue
central to, for example, Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International
Sales Corp.6 6 An American firm had ordered chickens from a Swiss firm.
Although the communications between the firms were in German, there
was no dispute about whether the key word "Hunner" translated to
"chicken." The only dispute was about whether in the context of these
communications, "chicken" meant only young chickens suitable for broil-
ing or frying or also included older chickens suitable only for stewing.
Certainly, the ordinary English word "chicken" (like the ordinary German
word "Hunner") has a generic meaning that includes all the meanings
the two parties in Frigaliment ascribed to the word. Among the ordinary
190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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English meanings of "chicken" are the broad generic meaning "a domestic
fowl" and the narrower particular-instance meaning "a domestic fowl of
less than one year old." Only the latter chickens are suitable for broiling
or frying.
The problem in Frigaliment thus was whether, among these many or-
dinary language meanings, the trade usage was sufficiently standard to
distinguish broilers and fryers from stewers, i.e., to distinguish young
chickens from old chickens. If it was, then "chicken" was a term for which
there was a technical use among persons in the poultry trade. But
"chicken" would not itself be a technical term67 even among members of
the poultry trade. In the trade "chicken" would be an ordinary English
word with an ordinary English meaning but with a technical use, i.e.,
with a settled convention for its use by poultry people in that they had
a settled preference for one among many ordinary English meanings of
the word. Two physicists may engage in an argument over unified field
theory, on the other hand, using the technical language of physics as well
as making technical uses of language. One of the interesting features of
such a discussion among physicists, speaking as physicists, is that their
interesting technical terms are theoretical terms, i.e., are from the gen-
eral and special theories of relativity, the theory of gravitational fields,
and so on as I shall explain later. Yet the most interesting feature of
physicists' talk as physicists is that, as I also explain later, overwhelm-
ingly, what they say is in ordinary English or ordinary French, etc.
68
Sometimes, perhaps not very often, a word starts out life as a technical
word, itself suggested through associations with ordinary words; but
speakers get careless in using the word until it no longer is a technical
word. That is, in speakers' failing to make technical distinctions in speak-
ing, the word loses its usefulness as a technical word, thereby losing its
status. This appears to have happened to "neurosis." Freud and others
took to using "neurosis" because of its associations (in German, French,
and English by way of Greek) with "nerve" and "nervous." They used it
to describe a particular psychological condition. Trouble for the techni-
cality of the word came, however, when ordinary language speakers went
around calling every minor eccentricity or emotional problem a "neurosis"
and referring to other people as "neurotic" without paying attention to
distinctions theoretical and clinical psychiatrists and psychologists would
make. Worse yet, psychiatrists and psychologists began using the word
in contexts that did not fit the original context in which the pioneers in
the field introduced the term. A few years ago, professional associations
of psychiatry and psychology abandoned "neurosis" as being no longer
67 Whether "chicken" is a technical term in the poultry trade, or merely is
an ordinary English word with a technical use in the poultry trade, turns on
whether the term has one or more relational properties I describe in the next
section. I am content here simply to say flatly that "chicken" has a technical use,
but is not a technical term in the poultry trade, and make the case during the
rest of the article.
68 C. CATON, supra note 26, at vii-viii. The anchor for all my views is his
point in the text to which this note attaches.
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technically useful. 69 Today it is a word of ordinary English for which there
are no technical uses, and it also no longer is a technical term.
Learning to make technical uses of words - whether the words are of
an ordinary language or of a technical language - is crucial to learning
to speak as do members of the trade, players of the game, professionals
in the field, or masters of the discipline. And making technical uses of
words needs to be distinguished from speaking carefully in some of the
say-mean/mean-say senses. There is, for example, no "technical use" of
"only," but a speaker who says what she means and means what she says
does not throw that word just anywhere into a sentence. Similarly, I do
not say I will call a friend if I intend to write; and I do not say I will
write a letter if I intend to write a note; nor do I ask to borrow a little
sugar and then take a pound. Yet, if I do say and then do these things,
we are entitled to say that, technically, I did not mean what I said or say
what I meant. That is, sometimes "technical" and, especially, "techni-
cally" mean the same as "exact" or "exactly"; and the contextual standards
for exactness sometimes vary with the circumstances. If I have no inten-
tion or ability to repay, I may ask to "borrow" a stamp from a friend,
because our social and linguistic conventions allow this, but I better ask
to "have" a stamp of a stranger.
When lawyers correct the speech of their nonlawyer friends by saying,
"You mean 'manslaughter,' not 'murder'" or correct the speech of law
students by saying, "You mean 'justifiable homicide,' not 'excusable hom-
icide,' "the lawyers are not necessarily using technical terms or teaching
others to use technical terms. They are, however, trying to teach word
usages that go with distinctions in meaning, and sometimes the distinc-
tions are technical in the sense that they involve niceties of use. To most
of us, a dog is a dog; to a kennelwoman, a dog is an adult male of that
species. Similarly, lawyers distinguish between "contracts supported by
consideration" and "contracts supported by a consideration-substitute."
Making technical uses of these legal phrases, however, need be nothing
more technical than the kennelwoman's "dog."
II. THREE VIEWS OF TECHNICAL LANGUAGE
A. Hart's Thesis
In his Oxford Inaugural Lecture of 1953,70 H.L.A. Hart argues that
legal theorists have gone awry because they have neglected four distinc-
tive characteristics of legal language and have been misled by the ap-
parent similarity of "What is a corporation" to "What is a dog."71 They
69 See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 9
(1980) (DSM-III) ("At the present time.., there is no consensus ... as to how to
define 'neurosis.' ").
'
0 Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954)
[hereinafter Hart, Definition].
71 Id. at 39-41.
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therefore have failed to see that legal language is sui generis, is unique
unto itself.
When someone asks, "What is a dog?" we can answer by pointing to a
dog or by giving a verbal definition by noting its genus and its differ-
entiating features. 72 But these modes of definition are inappropriate to
the crucial words of legal language, Hart argues, because there are no
ordinary factual counterparts to these words.73 That is, questions about
the meanings of legal words cannot be answered in the ways that we can
answer questions about the meanings of ordinary English words because,
although we can point to a dog, we cannot point to a right or a duty or
a corporation; therefore, we cannot define the words "right," "duty," or
"corporation.."74 Rather, he says we must "elucidate" the sentences "She
has a right to be paid by him" or "He has a duty to pay her" or "Smith
& Co., Ltd. has a contract with you. '75 These elucidations will show that
"the use of these sentences silently assumes ... the existence of a legal
system.. . [b]ut ... do[es] not state that it exists. '76 Legal language thus
presupposes, but does not assert, the existence of a legal system, a system
of rules of law; and this presupposition is one of "four distinctive
features"77 or "distinctive characteristics of legal language.."78 The second
distinctive feature is related to the first and concerns the use of legal
terms. Those uses presuppose the related rules of law that give the words
contextual meaning, and the statements we make using those legal terms
are conclusions of law we derive from applying the presupposed rules of
law to the unstated but presupposed facts. 79 To explain to Jones the mean-
ing of "Smith & Co., Ltd. owes $10 to White," we have to introduce Jones
to the English law of limited companies. 80
Hart does not term these "elucidations" "contextual definitions," but
the notion aptly captures his central thesis that the legal terms have
meaning only in the context of the existence of a legal system and only
through particular rules of law. Putting his thesis in terms of "contextual
definitions" also allows us to fit Hart's work into the tradition of Jeremy
Bentham, Bertrand Russell, and P.F. Strawson in such a way that we can
see exactly what, and how much, is at stake in his treatment of legal
language as being sui generis.
In 1905 Russell argued that we cannot define "the present King of
France" in terms of some object of denotation because there is no present
King of France, yet "The present King of France is bald" is not mean-
ingless.81 Russell secured meaning for "the present King of France" by
72 Id. at 46.
73 Id. at 38, 42, 45-47.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 47-49.
76 Id. at 42 (emphasis in original).
77 Id. at 42.78 Id. at 41, 45.
71 Id. at 42-43.
80 Id. at 50, 52-53. Hart imagines Jones is a "lawyer innocent of theories of
corporate personality because he was educated in a legal Arcadia where rights
and duties were ascribed only to individuals and all legal theory is banned." Id.
at 50.
81 Russell, On Denoting (1905), in B. RUSSELL, LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE 39 (R.
Marsh ed. 1956).
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laying down the meaning of "The present King of France is bald" as a
whole, i.e., by specifying the conditions under which the proposition is
true or false. Those conditions are that (1) there is at least one present
King of France, (2) there is at most one present King of France, and (3)
there is nothing that is presently King of France and not bald. Because
(1) is false, the whole proposition is false and, having a truth value, is
not meaningless. Russell also applied this mode of definition - or analysis
- to "King" and "France" until these, too, disappear and what is left are
words and phrases that denote things in the world or that are such logical
particles as "and." The "things" turn out to be sense data, whose names
are "this" and "that," although Russell is willing to allow "this table" to
denote this table as long as we understand that the table is a fiction, i.e.,
a constructed entity.82
Hart rejects the fictional approach to the issue of what corresponds to
"company" or "right," and he rejects the idea that "company" can be
defined mediately through existing things. 3 He therefore gives an ac-
count of the meaning of "company" more closely aligned with Strawson's
1950 account of "The present King of France is bald." Strawson suggested
that Russell had confused referring to an entity with asserting the ex-
istence of an entity. According to Strawson, a speaker who says, "The
present King of France is bald" refers to the present King of France and
presupposes there is such an entity; i.e., the speaker assumes, but does
not assert or state, that there is a present King of France. Because this
presupposition is false, the purported reference fails; the statement the
speaker makes, therefore, is neither true nor false, although Strawson
says the sentence the speaker uses to make this statement is meaningful . 4
The similarity between Hart's "elucidations" to Strawson's notion of pre-
suppositions then is apparent in the way Hart sets out the elucidation of
"a legal right."' 5
The Russell-Strawson enterprise is a meaning enterprise and one that
struggles with epistemological and metaphysical questions. Hart's strug-
82 See generally B. RUSSELL, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
(1960); B. RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (1968).
Hart, Definition, supra note 70, at 39, 45, 57-58. His primary target is
Bentham, however, not Russell.
84See generally Strawson, On Referring, 59 MIND 320 (1950), reprinted in C.
CATON, supra note 26, at 162.
Hart, Definition, supra note 70, at 50, 52-53.
I would, therefore, tender the following as an elucidation of the expression "a
legal right": (1) A statement of the form "X has a right" is true if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) There is in existence a legal system.
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some other person Y is, in the events
which have happened, obliged to do or abstain from some action.
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the choice either of X or
some other person authorized to act on his behalf so that either Y is bound
to do or abstain from some action only if X (or some authorized person)
so chooses or alternatively only until X (or such person) chooses otherwise.(2) A statement of the form "X has a right" is used to draw a conclusion of law
in a particular case which falls under such rules.
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gle is with the nature of the law, but it also is a meaning enterprise.
Having identified two kinds of presuppositional relations for legal state-
ments, he then sets out the other two distinguishing features of legal
language. Hart's third distinguishing general characteristic of legal lan-
guage is that sentences of legal language differ in meaning, import or
effect (or all three) depending upon who utters them, where, and when.
86
For example, a judge's saying from the bench, "Smith has a right to be
paid $10 by White" has the effect of making White legally liable to Smith.
But when a bus driver or a judge who is not on the bench utters the same
sentence, there is no legal effect at all although the bus driver and the
nonsittingjudge are expressing conclusions of law.8 7 Actually, Hart's view
is even more complicated than this; for, said by a judge in a case, "Smith
has a right" is not meaningless, although it is neither true nor false,
because it is "official, authoritative and . .. final." What the judge says
may be "wrong," but if so its wrongness does not lie in falsity and does
not arise in the same sort of way that the wrongness of "This ball is red"
arises when said of a blue ball. Moreover, whereas any of us may correct
the person who says "This ball is red" of a blue ball, none of us may
correct the judge who says wrongly "Smith has a right." There is no
remedy when the umpire wrongly calls a player out.
88
What accounts for part of the complexity of Hart's view here is a sub-
rosa speech act analysis, and particularly a performative-verb analysis
of the sort for which J.L. Austin is famous.8 9 Hart's view also appears to
be an early version of Paul Grice's extreme view that a difference in
speech acts of the order of the difference between the umpire's saying
"You're out!" and a Red Sox fan's saying "You're out!" is sufficient to yield
a difference in meaning in the two cases.90 This view in Definitions is
intermediate between the view Hart developed in his 1948 essay
9
' and
in his 1968 book,92 where he repudiated a totally ascriptional view of
legal language, and I therefore will omit further reference to this aspect
of Hart's view.
The fourth characteristic of legal language rests on a distinctive feature
of a universal function of any rules, which function is to apply to more
than one fact. Rules are general. Empirical rules are generalizations
across different facts; for example, the rule of the effects of gravity on
unsupported bodies is a generalization across the facts of falling leaves,
falling feathers, and falling stones.93 Hence, a rule conversely can apply
8Id. at 43-44.
87 Id.
88 /d.
89 See § II. B., infra.
See generally Grice, supra note 15.
91 Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, reprinted in A. FLEW,
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 151 (First and Second Series) (A. Flew ed. 1965).
92 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
93 The popular version of the generality of laws of science is that they are
inductions from facts or data; in truth, they usually are deductions from theories
which explain the data, although the data may "prompt" the theories. Experi-
ments of the last two years may eventually show to everyone's satisfaction that
there is a fifth force in nature that can affect the rate of fall of objects of different
composition.
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to different facts to yield the same conclusion, for example, that different
objects, irrespective of their weights, each will take so many seconds to
fall so many feet in a vacuum. Similarly, the same legal rule may make
Smith liable in negligence for leaving roller skates on the path and Jones
liable in negligence for leaving tennis balls on the sidewalk. 4 For rules
of law, however, Hart claims that the variation among fact patterns is
an essential element in the application of legal rules95 because the same
pattern of facts can be unified under different rules to yield the same or
different legal conclusions."
Hart begins by noting that any rule may "attach identical consequences
to... very different facts. '97 The same consequence flows in baseball after
the batter has three strikes or fails to reach first base before the ball gets
there, etc. (Hart's example is in terms of cricket.) In each case the batter
is out, and "no one of these different ways of being out is more essentially
what the word means than the others, and ... there need be nothing
common to all these ways of being out than their falling under the same
rule . ."91 But one of "the essential elements of the language of legal
corporations" shows that separate rules of law may apply to the facts to
yield conclusions about separate individual rights and duties of "the lives
of the men that overlap but do not coincide," thus treating the men as "a
collection of individuals ... but their actions may fall under rules of a
different kind ... [so that] we may speak in appropriately unified ways
... using a terminology ... of corporate law which will show that it is
this sort of rule we are applying to the facts.' 99
This phenomenon of multiplicity-of-applicable-rules, he says, is apt to
lead us to look for a way to give unity to the facts and thus lead us to
look for a continuing, identifiable, definable thing to anchor the various
facts. 100 For example, if Smith and Jones break White's finger, we can
subsume this fact under a rule of law that makes Smith and Jones in-
dividually liable to White - or jointly and individually liable. But we
also could subsume the same action of breaking White's finger under a
different rule of law that makes Smith & Co., Ltd. liable to White. The
possibility of these two different subsumptions - one to natural persons
and one to a corporation - may lead us to look for a way of distinguishing
them by saying that the facts differ and that in the latter case there is
a "fact" that Smith & Co., Ltd. broke White's finger, as if there were
something to correspond to "Smith & Co., Ltd." of the same sort, and in
the same way as, Smith corresponds to "Smith." We are prompted to this
view, Hart contends, because of the similarity of "Smith & Co., Ltd. is
liable to White" to "Smith is liable to White."
Because there is nothing corresponding to "Smith & Co., Ltd." and
because "Smith & Co., Ltd." has meaning only insofar as the law of
94Hart, Definition, supra note 70, at 44. The particular extrapolations and
examples I give here are mine, not Hart's.
951 Id. at 45.
96See id. at 44-45.
97 Id. at 44.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 45.100 Id. at 45.
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English limited companies gives it meaning, Hart says, we must account
for the similarity between "Smith is liable to White" and "Smith & Co.,
Ltd. is liable to White" by saying that different rules apply to the same
facts, instead of saying the facts differ. To account for the similarity
between the two liability judgments by saying the facts differ is to make
the conceptual mistake of treating Smith & Co., Ltd. as if it would be a
something-in-the-world even if there were no English law of limited com-
panies.
The gist of Hart's view then is the following. Legal language is dis-
tinctive because it presupposes the existence of a legal system and pre-
supposes particular rules of law, against the background of which legal
language obtains its meaningfulness and particular meaning, and be-
cause of the distinctive feature of rules of law as rules. There are such
things as dogs apart from law, apart from society, and apart from all
language (including English). "A rose by any other name would smell as
sweet." The word "dog" is part of ordinary English, and its meaning can
be given verbally by naming the genus and differentiating features or
by pointing to one and saying, "That is a dog." In contrast, because there
is nothing to which we can point and say, "That is a company," there are
no such things as companies apart from the law. The word "company" is
a legal word (a law word) whose meaning is given only by and accessible
only through the law. In using "company" we "speak the law" and know
what we are saying only insofar as we know the law of companies.
There are a number of points on which to criticize what Hart says.
Whether Hart seriously intends to say that only legal rules have the
multiplicity-of-applicable-rules feature, i.e., that different rules can apply
to the same facts, is not entirely clear. He says it is one of "four distinctive
features" of legal language.10' But, of course, this phenomenon is not
distinctive. Two different laws of physics can apply to the same facts and
each yield true conclusions. For example, the different rules of Newtonian
mechanics and Einsteinian physics can apply to the same facts to yield,
within certain limits, the same conclusions or to yield, within other limits,
different conclusions (although certainly, at some point, the Newtonian
rule will "break down.") We simply cannot explain the differences between
Newtonian results and Einsteinian results by saying the facts differ in
the two cases; what differ are the rules, not the facts.
This is not to deny, of course, that in some areas of physics we do
distinguish by saying the facts differ - or, better, by saying the views
of the facts differ, for we do not have theory-independent ways of assessing
what "the facts" are. For example, under certain measurement-rules light
exhibits particle behavior, but under other rules it exhibits wave behav-
ior, yet we cannot say that light is made of particles (or is waves) inde-
pendent, of the particle-measuring rules, etc. And under some rules, light
is "wavical," i.e., these rules are neutral as to what light "is" on the
particle-wave continuum. Similarly, we have a Euclidean theory of space,
101 Id. at 42, 45.
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which fits Newtonian physics, and a Riemannian theory of space, which
fits the general theory of relativity; but we have considerable difficulty
in "deciding" whether parallel lines converge in "real space."
Thus, there is a level of Hart's discussion of legal rules that is exactly
correct. Different rules of law can apply to the same facts, and we err if
we try to distinguish the rules by distinguishing the facts. But this feature
of legal rules is not distinctive of legal rules. It is not unique to them.
Nor is this the only one of the four distinctive features he identifies for
legal language that fails to be distinctive in any fundamental sense. As
to his point about the presupposition of legal statements, we could point
out that any use of language, short of "The universe exists," presupposes,
but does not assert or state, that a universe exists. Similarly, any use of
language presupposes there is a point to using language. Speech, after
all, is other-regarding. Why stop, then, with the presupposition that a
legal system exists? Why not add as a presupposition that the universe
exists or that there are other persons in the world? Even supposing Hart
could give sound reasons for limiting the most general presupposition of
legal language to the presuppositions that a legal system exists, wherein
lies the distinctiveness of legal language if biological language or baseball
language, for example, presupposes a taxonomic system exists or that
baseball exists? What is special about legal language, if the same kind
of point can be made about moral language, or political language, or
scientific language, or metaphysical language, or even, mirabile dictu,
ordinary language?
What is important in Hart's view, is that he is attempting to tell us
how we can use the word "company" or the word "right" without there
being any thing that corresponds to these terms. But this project itself
puts him in deeper trouble. His answer is that the meanings of these
words are given by the system of the rules of law, that this system carves
out a category of "objects," albeit not in any ordinary sense of "object,"
for there is not now and never will be anything to which we can point.
Rather, the rules of law about limited companies or the rules of law about
rights not only give the meanings of these words, but also denominate
- constitute - what counts as a company or a right. They lay down the
criteria for something's counting as a company by laying down, in a sense,
the proper modes of speaking; in so laying down the criteria, they effec-
tuate a categorization. Further, he says, when we use these legal words
whose meanings are constituted under rules of law in connection with
other words that do have corresponding objects (either directly or me-
diately), the other words shift in meaning and become legal words, too.
Thus, the word "'will' shifts its meaning when we use it of a company
.... ,,102 We then do not mean the same things by these words when we
say "Lee Iacocca wills himself to greatness" and "The Chrysler Corpo-
ration wills itself to greatness," or when we say "Iacocca can pay a bill"
and "The Chrysler Corporation can pay a bill." On Hart's view, therefore,
all of legal language ultimately would be sui generis because even such
112 Id. at 59.
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apparently ordinary English words as "can" take on a special legal mean-
ing when we use them with words such as "company" that have meaning
only in and through rules of law.
Indeed, he does qualify his view here, by saying that these words -
e.g., "will" and "can" - retain their ordinary connections to the facts,
but also then carry the legal connections: "[A]ny ordinary words or
phrases when conjoined with the names of corporations take on a special
legal use, for the words are correlated with the facts, not solely by the
rules of ordinary English but also by the rules of English law .... "; but
he really cannot carry this qualification out fully as is evident in the full
context of this quote.10 3
Hart need not have gone to these extremes with respect to the meanings
of ordinary language words. What he needs is a method of anchoring
statements involving certain fundamental legal terms to the world, by
securing meanings for these terms without invention, because these terms
are not meaningless yet, on his view, do not directly or mediately cor-
respond to entities in the world. Having secured meanings for these fun-
damental legal terms, he need not have secured legal meanings for terms
of ordinary language, which already have meanings. He need not have
given "can" or "will" legal meaning,10 any more than he would need to
give "red" or "round," "dollars" or "English pounds" legal meaning. Fur-
ther, if he insists on making "will" or "can" into a legal word when used
in connection with "company," he cannot explain why he does not simi-
larly need to give a legal meaning for "and" or "&" when used in "Smith
& Co., Ltd." Hart's legal language ends up being completely a language
unto itself, and that is a mistake. What stood in need of elucidation was
not everything, but only that which played a central role in legal talk
but for which there was not something to which we could point and say
"That is a so-and-so."
Charles Caton fares better than Hart in defining technical languages,
among which he also numbers the language of the law. In particular, his
views expressly reject the possibility that technical language users use
"and" or "hardly" any differently than ordinary language users do.
103 Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
It was once said that a corporation has no real will but a fictitious will imputed
by law, and that since such a will so imputed could effect only lawful ends, we
cannot, if we are logically consistent, say that it could commit a crime, or even
perhaps a tort. Of course this use of the fiction theory does conjure up an
allegorical picture .... But the picture is more misleading than even an allegory
should be, because it conceals the fact that the word "will" shifts its meaning
when we use it of a company: the sense in which a company has a will is not
that it wants to do legal or illegal actions but that certain expressions used to
describe voluntary actions of individuals may be used of it under conditions
prescribed by legal rules. And from the bare fact that the law does prescribe
such conditions for a wide range of expressions (which is all that imputing a
will to a company can mean) it cannot be deduced that these conditions do not
include the commission of a criminal or tortious act. Analogy with a living
person and shift of meaning are therefore of the essence of the mode of legal
statement which refers to corporate bodies. But these are just what they are.
Analogy is not identity ... and shift in meaning is not fiction ....
Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
104 Hart, Definition, supra note 70, at 56-58 ("can"), 58-59 ("will").
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B. Caton's view
Almost twenty-five years ago, Charles Caton wrote a five-page sketch
of technical language,105 and no one appears to have done more or better
in the intervening years. The point Caton emphasizes is that "technical
language is always an adjunct of ordinary language," whether ordinary
English, ordinary French, or ordinary Swahili.10 6 Technical languages
have the same syntax as ordinary language, and speech acts performable
in ordinary discourse are performable in technical contexts; for example,
"requests, assertions, questions, explanations of what one was refer.-Ing
to, etc."'10 7 Further, clarifications are made in the same ways in technical
languages as they are in ordinary languages, and "the presuppositions,
implications, suggestions, etc. of technical language seem to be of the
same sorts and achieved by the same means as in ordinary language
.... ",01 The substantial part of these latter similarities is that words and
phrases such as "the," a, is, all," "two," "at least," and," Or," "if...
then," "hardly," "very," and so on, "occur in technical contexts in the same
senses [as] in everyday contexts."'' 9
There may be a very few speech acts, he says, that are performable in
technical languages that are not ordinary speech acts, "perhaps, things
like deposing, sentencing a prisoner, and saying 'J'adoube.' "110 But a
technical language may be "defined only by reference to some particular
discipline or occupation or activity among the practitioners of which it
is current ... [and] consists largely, if not entirely, of vocabulary items
.... ,"' He then describes these vocabulary items and gives an example
for each type, "i.e., words and phrases not part of the related ordinary
language at all (e.g., 'meson') or not having in ordinary language the
senses given them in the discipline in question (e.g., 'ring' in algebra).'1 2
We learn technical languages "against the background of ordinary lan-
guage" because the technical languages are adjuncts to the ordinary lan-
guage. 1 3 Some technical languages we learn as we grow up, and others
we learn by study, because we come to know, develop interest in, and do
things "that not everyone or even most people do ... and thus [acquire]
Iom C. CATON, supra note 26, at v., vi-xi.
10I Id. at viii.
10? Id.
"
0 8 Id. To say that the syntax of technical and ordinary languages is the same
and that the inferences, suggestions, etc. of the former are of the same sorts and
by the same means as the latter is not necessarily to deny that there may be
some transformational differences. For example, "red roses" and "roses that are
red" in English are transformational equivalents but "punitive damages" and
"damages that are punitive" are not fully transformational equivalents in legal
language in every context of use. Morrison, Getting A Rule Right and Writing a
Wrong Rule: The IRS Demands a Return on all Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L.
REv. 39, 41-42 (1984).
" C. CATON, supra note 26, at vii (examples from original).
110 1d.
"I Id. at vii. I will refer to this as "the practitioners' definition."
112Id.
113Id.
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the technical language that accompanies knowing, learning about, and
doing these things."' 14 Allowing for differences in intelligence and inter-
est, however, technical languages are "as available ... as ordinary lan-
guage." 5
Caton's comments and examples make plain that he counts the lan-
guages of physics, mathematics, farming, chess, and the law as among
technical languages; and three of the several examples he gives of tech-
nical terms are "meson" from physics, "ring" from algebra, and "J'adoube"
of chess.
16
As is true of dispositional definitions, defining technical languages by
cross-reference to how members of a discipline, occupation, or activity
talk with one another raises some questions. Certainly, if someone who
speaks a technical language uses that language in speaking with someone
who does not know the language, the conversation may never get off the
ground. The other may not understand at all or may misunderstand and
so on. But there are other problems. What shall we say, for example,
about the phenomenon of a nonparticipant's correctly using a technical
term, or a participant's using an expression from the technical language
in a conversation with someone who does not know the technical language
but who does not misunderstand?
For example, I am neither in the position to dub knights nor do I have
any interest in or know how to play chess; but I can and do say "J'adoube"
in speaking to a colleague as I adjust his or her hood just before the
graduation procession. Moreover, as a matter of my own linguistic history,
I am none too sure I knew "J'adoube" had royal or chess uses until well
after I had taken to using it. Someone may have told me about the chess
use, but the first time I remember hearing the expression was one day
in Paris as a Frenchman removed a leaf from my hair as we stood on the
corner while he gave me a miniature French lesson in "right," "left," and
I" Id. at ix. Caton clearly is right about this. For example, in these days of
mass media, everyone has an opportunity to learn bits of biology and its language
simply by reading the newspaper. An Associated Press wire service story in 1984
taught a biology lesson (that the snail darter is a member of the perch family),
a linguistic lesson (that Percina tanasis is "snail darter" "in English"), gave legal
information (that the snail darter had been moved from the endangered species
list to the threatened species list), recounted an item of history (that construction
of a dam had been halted for two years because it threatened the existence of the
tiny fish) and, in the headline, made a biological pun on a legal matter: "Snail
darter taken off special perch." St. Paul Pioneer Press/Dispatch, Saturday, July
7, 1984, 10A col. 1. Consider also, then, the phenomena of Lewis Thomas and
Stephen Jay Gould, who are prize winning, best selling writers. L. THOMAS, THE
LiVES OF A CELL (1974); S.J. GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB (1980). Only adults with
mental blinders today can keep from learning some of the facts and theories of
the vast and exploding horizons of knowledge in the sciences and the arts. And
only they can avoid having some familiarity with a variety of the languages of
these areas of expertise. On the other hand, only those persons who have studied
these areas of expertise have become fully conversant in the related languages.
These are the sorts of points Caton has in mind.
C. CATON, supra note 26, at viii.
16 Caton may have intended "J'adoube" in its knight-dubbing ceremonial
use, but the rest of his discussions suggest he had the chess use in mind.
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"two blocks" so that I could find my way to a museum. I could not speak
or read French at the time, and he did not speak English. Did I learn
French, or did I learn a technical expression of the language of chess that
he borrowed for the nonchess occasion? Now that I know there is a chess
use, do I borrow the technical term, or am I speaking French as I adjust
a colleague's hood? If we both played chess, would that affect the nature
of the expression when I use it as I adjust the hood?
Similarly, what shall we say of the following conversation between the
politically conservative horseman-farmer father of a college student and
the student's friend. Father: "Jim tells me you two are learning about
rings and fields and learning right ideals." Jim's friend: "Well, our rings
and fields are hardly the kind you could keep a horse in, sir, and we're
learning about left ideals and two-sided ideals, too." In Jim's previous
conversation with his father, he may have made puns on "ring," "field,"
and "ideal" by playing off the algebraic words; and the father now is doing
that, too. Or Jim may have misdirected his father by playing off those
algebraic words - he is supposed to be studying agriculture and staying
away from those pinko-liberals in the math department, and now his
friend has given the game away. Or possibly the father, having caught
only the surface of Jim's explanation of his abstract algebra course, is
making puns by playing off the ordinary English words "field" and "ideal."
Is, then, his pun on "ring" a horseman's pun or an English speaker's pun?
That is, which of the three - ordinary English, farmer/horseman's lan-
guage, or algebraist's language - is his "ring" from and against which
one does it play?
Consider some of the immense varieties of ways - noun, verb, etc.,
and idiom - any of us may use "ring": We say that we wear wedding
rings, kiss bishops' rings, wear button earrings, remove napkin rings,
count rings of trees, bemoan rings around our eyes, beware rings around
the moon, open ring binders, make rings around others, sit in groups in
rings, hear the ring at the door or the ringing telephone, hear a speech
that does not ring true or that rings a bell or that rings with emotion;
curtains ring up at theaters and down on life, we have ringing headaches
and our ears ring, and we ring in the new year while shots ring out in
the dark. After all this, is the farmer/horseman's "ring" or the circus
performer's or dressage learner's "ringmaster" a technical word of the
language of farmers or horsemen or of circuses or dressage?
Of course, these uses of "ring" and "ringmaster" do not fit either of the
two descriptions Caton gives of the "vocabulary items" that make up a
technical language. These are words that have a use in ordinary language,
unlike the physicists's "meson"; and they are not words "not having in
ordinary language the senses given them in the discipline in question."
But then neither does "J'adoube" fit Caton's descriptions as far as I can
see. The question then is, what wears the skirt in this description of
technical languages - the definition that can be given "only by reference
to some particular discipline or occupation or activity," or the two de-
scriptions of technical terms?
If the participants' definition of technical languages is the controlling
factor, then the horseman's "ring" is a technical term. That goes too far.
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It allows any term that practitioners of any art use with some regularity
among themselves to be a technical term. What, then, makes the math-
ematician's "ring" a technical term must be inextricably tied up with not
only the "participants"' factor but also with its having one of the two
characteristics Caton describes for technical terms. Caton suggests that
what makes "ring" technical in algebra is that its ordinary use does not
have the senses it has in mathematics. That looks right:
Definition: A ring (R, *,") is a nonempty set R, together with
two binary operations (compositions) * and ", such that R is a
commutative group with respect to * and a semi-group with
respect to ", and such that the right and left distributive laws
of " over * hold ... [where * is addition and " is multiplica-
tion].1 17
But, of course, it is not quite right. After all, mathematicians did not
name these things "rings" for no reason, otherwise they might just as
well have called them "shelves," "sofas," or "exxadexxes." Noticing this
is the converse of noticing that the physicist's "meson" or "quark" is "not
part of... ordinary" English. That is, even if we agree the mathemati-
cian's "ring" has a sense that is not part of the everyday sense of "ring"
that does not mean the mathematician's "ring" is as arbitrary as the
physicist's "quark."
There are two advantages of Caton's view over Hart's, however. First,
Caton does not have to provide a technical-meaning explanation for each
word physicists, farmers, and chess players use in speaking among them-
selves about, respectively, matters of physics, farming, or chess. This is
because Caton's technical language is an adjunct of - parasitic on -
ordinary language, and most of the words technical language users will
use in everything they say is in ordinary English or ordinary French and
so on, even when they speak the technical language of physics, farming,
or chess. Hart's deepest trouble is that, under his view, technical terms
affect the meaning of each other word used in connection with the tech-
nical word, and that is too large a project for his view to handle. Far from
being parasitic on ordinary language, Hart's technical language is cut
off from ordinary English at each turn. Whatever is intuitively correct
about Hart's view with respect to how difficult technical language sen-
tences are to comprehend for those who do not know the discipline, oc-
cupation, or activity and consequently do not know the associated
language, he goes too far in spreading that comprehension-difficulty to
each element of the whole sentence.
The second advantage of Caton's view over Hart's is that the former's
definitions and descriptions allow us to say the languages of physics and
of mathematics are technical languages, where that means again that
117 W. BARNES, INTRODUCTION TO ABSTRACT ALGEBRA 77 (1963). For an a, b,
and c members of R, then
(b * c)"a (b " a) * (c " a), and
a "(b*c) (a " b) * (a " c).
Id.
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the users thereof mostly use ordinary language words but also use tech-
nical terms of one of the two types Caton describes. One of our basic
intuitions about technical languages is that, however we characterize
them, the languages of mathematics and of the physical sciences are
technical languages. As to the languages of farming or the law or chess,
we may have no intuitions; at least, we may have different views among
ourselves about the technicality of these languages.
Under Hart's view, however, although the languages of the law and of
chess or of baseball are technical languages, the languages of mathe-
matics and of the physical sciences essentially are not. This is because
of the way Hart's rose-is-a-rose-is-a-rose principle works in conjunction
with the heart of his anti-reductionist, technical language view, namely
constitutive meanings. What makes his "corporation" a technical word
is that it has meaning only in and through the rules of law, which lay
down the conditions under which a corporation exists and under which
we correctly may use "corporation." The word "dog," on the other hand,
is not such a constitutive noun; this word has meaning we can determine
by pointing to a dog or by naming its genus and differentiating features.
Moreover, irrespective of what we say, dogs exist and are what they are;
but corporations and knights of chess exist only because and as we say
they do. This is Hart's rose-principle. That very principle then prevents
almost all of the interesting words of physics from being technical words.
We can point to some of them, although we need special equipment some-
times to do so; more importantly, the other interesting words are for things
that exist even if we do not, but are at least as hard to point to as
corporations. For example, gravity exists and is what it is independent
of us every bit as much as is true of a dog; and the same is true of the
fundamental constituents of matter, which physicists call "quarks." In-
deed, the only words of the languages of science that are technical in
Hart's constitutive sense are the procedural words, i.e., the words for
doing things in a physics or chemistry laboratory and so on.
This looks like a mistake. Whatever a technical language is, we are
sure the languages of physics, chemistry, biology, etc., are such languages;
and we are sure their technicality does not rest on words as marginally
related to physics, etc., as procedural (i.e., doing) words are. If this is the
price of explaining the technicality of the language of the law, it is too
high a price because it is too deeply counter-intuitive.
In the next two sections I will be developing a third view of technical
languages. That theory importantly is related to both Caton's view and
Hart's view. My view rests on Caton's insight that technicality rests on
a few words technical language users use while they concurrently are
using words of ordinary language in the same ways any of us uses these
ordinary language words. It also expands upon the definitions of these
few, special words, the characterizations of which Caton began with his
two descriptions of technical terms, i.e., the ones of which "meson" of
physics and "ring" of algebra are examples.
I also draw on two of Hart's insights. We may give very adequate
explanations of the technicality of procedural terms using his constitutive
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approach; and that approach will strike most people as being intellec-
tually more satisfying for the procedural terms of the language of the
law than is Caton's, although I will construct an explanation under my
version of Caton's view that some of us will find sufficiently decent. The
second of Hart's insights is the one we obtain by looking at his constitutive
approach at an angle or without our analytic glasses, so to speak. The
word "quark," for example, is a word that gets its meaning only against
and through particular theories of physics. Only with reference to those
theories can we use the physicist's word, and this view vaguely echoes
Hart's constitutive view of the meaning of "corporation."
Once I have set out these points in detail, I will turn to the nonpro-
cedural terms of the language of the law and investigate whether it is a
technical language in the sense I have developed.
C. Familiar Terms and Theoretical Terms
What makes the physicist's language a technical language? The short
answer is, she speaks a technical language of physics insofar as when
she is speaking as a physicist, she uses words or terms that are not
familiar to those of us who have an excellent grasp of English but do not
know physics. As answers go, however, this one is not yet helpful, and I
need to flesh it out.
Familiar words are part of the ordinary English language, and a word
is familiar when speakers of English from all stations of life use the word
in much the same ways specialists do. That is, when the specialist's
meaning, even if it deviates slightly from our own, is available to us
because we speak English already, then the word is familiar and is not
a technical term. A physicist, for example, might say a table is not solid
and might confuse us for a moment because we both know a 65 lb. rock
is resting on top of it. But the physicist just means the table is made up
of matter that is "scattered" - "That is," she says, "the thing has holes
in it." We understand that use of "not solid"; we use the phrase the same
way when describing slices of Swiss cheese. Of course, we also talk of
tables as being solid and thus talk about the phenomenon of a table's
being able to bear some object without collapsing or having the object
fall through the table. This may lead us to doubt the physicist's "factual"
claim, until we understand she is not talking about that phenomenon in
using "solid" as she does. The physicist's "solid" is just as much a part of
our English language as is our "solid," although there is a difference
between her use and our everyday uses. That difference is a difference
of deployment or emphasis. She emphasizes the existences of spaces that
we ignore or do not notice and thus counts fewer things as being solid
than do we. But she does this only while she is "speaking physics"; when
she buys furniture, she ignores those very same spaces. And the word
"solid" is not a technical word at all, even when a physicist uses it with
an emphasis that differs from ours. Words with deployment or emphasis
differences are like the technical-use words that are fixed to one-among-
many meanings, such as the poultry tradist's "chicken." The physicist's
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"not solid," then, applied to a sturdy wooden table would be a technical
use of the ordinary English word "solid." The technical use is in English,
however, just as the poultry tradist's technical use of "chicken" is, al-
though this happens to be true of "solid" for a different reason than for
"chicken": In English we use "solid" with different deployments; it is only
superficially a one-placed predicate, and that is at bottom what accounts
for our using "solid" of different things not all of which are solid in the
same way. That is, our English "solid" always is comparative or always
has deployment-differences built into or undergirding it. When an astro-
physicist uses "solid fuel," for example, there is no special emphasis-
difference from our use of "solid table" and "solid block of Swiss cheese."
No wonder "solid" is not a technical term in physics. It is "in" physics, if
at all, only to the extent that ordinary English words are part of the
linguistic scene in physics, and its deployment-difference potentials al-
ready are built in from ordinary English.
Similarly, the word "cell" is English, is part of our ordinary language,
and is a familiar word although the architect uses it to speak of part of
a vaulted ceiling; the beekeeper, of a honey comb; the biologist, of a living
organism; the botanist, of an anther; the chemist, of a battery; the en-
tomologist, of an insect's wing; the policeman, of ajail; the mathematician,
of a table; the monk, of a monastery; the politician, of a party; etc. The
architect and the mechanic use the chemist's "cell" to talk about why the
architect's car did not start this morning; the prisoner, the lawyer, and
the journalist use the policeman's "cell" to talk about where the prisoner
will spend the night; and we all use the biologist's "cell" to talk about
the basic structural unit of plant and animal life. Further, the monk's
use of "cell" may create an ambiguity. He may be speaking about a small
room in his monastery, or he may be speaking of his monastery's relation
to his religious house, which is not a building. In either case, the ambi-
guity is in English not in some technical language. One who is not an
ecclesiastic can create the same ambiguity in the course of writing a
romance novel. In short, the word "cell" is not a technical term even when
it occurs in a technical language such as the language of biology.
In this, the biologist's "cell" significantly differs from the physicist's
"quark." For, although the former's "cell" means "basic structural unit
of plant and animal life" and the latter's "quark" means "fundamental
constituent of matter," "cell" already is part of English whereas "quark"
is not, and may never become, part of English. One, but not the sole,
reason for this difference is that we can see the biologist's cells (sometimes
even without the aid of a microscope), but we cannot see the physicist's
quarks. Another, more important reason for this difference is that all of
the varieties of meanings or uses of "cell" are undergirded by our familiar
concepts of bounded spaces, whereas the meaning or use of "quark" is
undergirded by sophisticated concepts of contemporary theoretical phys-
ics, a point to which I shall return. "Cell" is ordinary English, but "quark"
is a technical term and, moreover, is a theoretical term. With the excep-
tion of the occasional reference to one sentence in James Joyce's Finne-
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gans Wake, 118 speakers of English who use the word "quark"1 9 today use
a theoretical and technical term of physics. 120 Their sentences are mean-
ingful because the words, in this order, are; and "quark" is meaningful
because certain theories of physics give it meaning. The speakers may
fully know the meaning of the sentences in which they and others use
"quark"; if so, they know contemporary theoretical physics fully. On the
other hand, the speakers may have some lesser grasp of physics and a
consequently less full understanding of the meaning of "quark." In any
event, speakers either attempt to use the physicist's meaning or else do
not use the physicist's word, even if they utter or write a sound or symbol
that appears to be the same as the physicist's "quark." Only with reference
to the theory of physics can we test the proper use of the technical pred-
icate ". .. is a quark."
Just because the individual words in a sentence are familiar, however,
does not mean that there is not a technical language related in some way
to that sentence. Thus, compare "This is a catenary curve" with "y = k
cos h (x/k)" - the former is in ordinary English, but the latter is in the
language of mathematics, which contains some English words such as
"equals" although its symbol often is "=" and although it never occurs
in the past tense, etc. The mathematician and the telephone linecrew
both use "catenary" to describe the curve of the telephone line between
two poles, and they utter English sentences in so doing, for example,
"This catenary curve is too deep; we'd better raise the ends of the line or
put the poles further apart." If there are a canary and a cat around, they
may make a joke, and so on. Yet when the mathematician writes "y =
k cos h (x/k)" on the blackboard or utters it in teaching, she writes or
utters a sentence of mathematics, not of English. You and I will under-
stand what she writes or says when we learn some mathematics (and
vice versa). We cannot survive here on even an excellent command of
English.
Further, when next she writes, "x2a 2 - y 2b2 = 1" on the board, she has
stated another sentence of mathematics, namely of geometry. Suppose
she then says, "This equation written on the board describes a hyperbola,
which is a set of points in a plane whose distances to two fixed points in
the plane have a constant difference. That is," she says, "a hyperbola is
a curve consisting of two distinct and similar branches, formed by the
intersection of a plane with a right circular cone when the plane makes
a greater angle with the base than does the generator of a cone." Although
each of her words, including "hyperbola," is an ordinary English word -
11 J. JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE 383 (1939) ("Three Quarks for Muster Mark!").
119 Compare the "non-English, non-German" "quark" of physics with the
German word that sounds like "quark" and is the name of a food.
120 Or perhaps the word is just a theoretical term. In any event, such things
as answers to questions about the word do not count because then the word is
being mentioned to talk about the word, not being used to talk about the fun-
damental constituent of matter. (For example: "The way to spell 'quark' ... ";
"The word he missed on the test was 'quark' "; "What does 'quark' mean?") Sim-
ilarly, nonsense and misspeakings/mistypings do not count. (For example: "Bring
me a quark of stars" or "Bring me a quark of milk.")
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i.e., is a familiar word - and although the grammatical form of what
she says is that of English grammar, if this is English, most of us would
prefer to "speak Mathematics," i.e., x2a 2 - y2b 2 = 1, especially if we rec-
ognize a hyperbola when we see one.
The language of mathematics is a technical language, and it supremely
embodies one of the hallmarks of technical languages: One of the primary
utility features of a technical language is that it enables those of us who
speak it to say more in a more comprehensible, thorough, and exact way,
using less time and fewer words than would using ordinary English or
German or Swahili. The mathematician's "x2a 2 - y2b2 = 1" is not simply
shorter. It is more easily comprehensible, to those who know mathematics,
than is the English equivalent. Conversely we have the ability to restate
a mathematical sentence in English; but, although we can make such
restatements, they are not worth the effort in the long run, except for
teaching purposes and even then only in small doses, because the re-
statements are too dense for comprehension. We can make the restate-
ments because we used English in learning the technical language. Think
of our old high school geometry textbook. Except for the diagrams and
the "proofs," virtually every sentence in each paragraph was in ordinary,
everyday, garden variety English. Think, too, of how many such sentences
there were and how, now that you and I know plane geometry, we would
not need for the textbook to contain anything more than the axioms and
theorems. Why, then, did we once have to read all those English sentences
and paragraphs? The answer is, they helped us pick up the notions of
geometry and the language of geometry. They also are the sentences we
would use to teach someone else that language; and for that purpose, for
example, we might now ourselves use forty or so, patiently uttered, Eng-
lish sentences initially for the theorem about the hypotenuse.
Except for these teaching purposes, there is little point, however, in
attempting to "analyze" the technical language of mathematics back into
English because the restated sentences either will be too dense for easy
comprehension (the definition of hyperbola) or the restatements will re-
quire an entire book for even the simplest set of technical language sen-
tences to be comprehensible to the ordinary English speaker (the axioms
and theorems of plane geometry), and the very complex sentences will
take volumes (for example, topology). Of course, there are such books or
volumes of books if we think, for example, of each book on topology as
"including" the first grader's arithmetic book, etc., the ninth grader's
algebra book, the tenth grader's geometry book, and so on.
Further, just as the language of mathematics is a technical language,
so too is the language of physics; indeed, there is a substantial sense in
which mathematics is the language of physics.12 ' Yet, here, there is an
121 Similarly with respect to musical notation, the notation may be the - or
a substantial part of a - language of music. People who can read the notation
can read a symphony the way you and I can read a poem. Composers quote one
another, and they write what other readers of the notation recognize as something
like a question-and-answer sequence in the unresolved chord and its consequent
passage (which may not be immediate). They call Mahler's 6th symphony, for
example, "tragic" because it ends in a minor key and an "unrelieved mood." On
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odd phenomenon; for a physicist can explain to us one of physics' most
theoretical notions, that of a quark, in one book of modest length written
in English. 122 After reading such a book we come closer to being able to
understand the physicist who speaks of quarks (even if we skipped past
the occasional mathematical sentence) than we (if we are not learned in
mathematics) ever will come to understanding the mathematician's so-
lution to the four-color problem, which is the problem of proving that four
colors are adequate to the task of coloring a map without having distin-
guishable areas become indistinguishable because they are of the same
color. If we are cartographers or painters in the style of Mondrian (but
without his black division lines), we will be happy to know that we safely
can use four colors rather than five, but we would have to be mathe-
maticians to understand why this is true. The difference between the
four-color problem and the quark, in part, is that the heart of the four-
color problem is one of proof, hence of mathematics and of a sophisticated
sort,2 3 whereas the quark is part of a general theory of the universe and,
in a way, there is more "room" for us to have a modest explanation of
that theory couched in a language that vastly, overwhelmingly is ordinary
English. For all that, "quark" is a technical term of the technical language
of physics, and the substantial aspect of its technicality rests in its being
given meaning in a theory.
Perhaps most terms central to theories are technical terms, but not all
of them are. For example, "cell" is part of the theory (or theories) of
biology, but it is not a technical term. We do not have to learn the biol-
ogist's theories to learn the meaning of "cell" even as the biologist uses
it. Her theory is that a cell is the basic structure of plant and animal life,
but she can teach us to use "cell" of the same thing she does by pointing
them out to us under a microscope. Her pointing method of teaching works
here because we already know about using "cell" ofjails, of batteries, and
of the Communist party. 124 We may make sense of saying "cell" is a
theoretical term in biology; however, it is not a technical term.
the other hand, although readers of music can "hear" what they read, good cooks
can "taste" a recipe they read. And on this unresolved chord, let me just say that
I have not come close to giving an adequate description of language or of technical
language in this article. Some of the things an adequate description would have
to take into account are what to say about bridge codes and musical notation and
perhaps even about the pictorial messages of art. Here, too, there seems to be
something very close to theoretical terms, and that may indicate there is a tech-
nical language of art.
122 H. FRITZSCH, QUARKS (Eng. trans. 1983). Actually, he wrote in German.
123 Indeed, the proof in this particular case has raised substantial metath-
eoretic questions because of its style - it essentially is a computer print-out of
all possible variations and permutations. Thus, this proof is something like a
truth table and does not comport with traditional notions of mathematical proof.
124 Philosphers have queried whether we can teach the meanings of words
by pointing: (To what do we point? The shape? color? texture? use?) These phi-
losophers, however, are talking about a different level of instruction via pointing
as being problematic; my biologist will round out her pointing by saying things
such as "Do you see these walls or wall-like membranes?" and will be talking to
someone who already speaks English.
19891
HeinOnline  -- 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 307 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Not only are not all of the central terms in the sciences not technical
terms, although they need to be connected to theory in that science to be
central terms, but also not all theoretical terms are in the sciences. Fur-
ther, some words appear to present difficulties for "translation" into every-
day English that are of a different order than the "mathematical
restatements" problem and for an entirely different reason. Think, for
example, of how we learn religious language. I say "I made this chair";
you say "God made this rainbow." We learn your use after we learn mine,
and the "standardness" of my use creates some puzzles about your use.
For example, if we both understand God to be outside of time, yet agree
this rainbow is in the here and now, and if you really mean to be speaking
of this rainbow itself (rather than of its archetype, so to speak), then there
is a puzzle about how something that is outside of time can act in time.
We might develop a complex theory to explain or solve the puzzle. When
we do we will create a language of theology.12 5
Similarly, if I say, "Pharaoh spoke to Moses," you can ask, "In what
language did Pharaoh speak?" and I can answer (falsely) "In English" or
(truly) "In some form of ancient Egyptian." But if you say "God spoke to
Moses," there is no clearly true answer to my question, "In what language
did God speak?" Indeed, the question is "wrongheaded" and shows that
I have not fully understood the effect that the word "God" has on the
remainder of the words in "God spoke to Moses." We could say you are
using "spoke" metaphorically or anthropomorphically; but if we mean to
be fully fair, we would say you are speaking the language of religion, i.e.,
are making a religious use of the ordinary English word "spoke." That
may appear to be equivalent in effect to saying that "translating" the
"religious" sentence "God spoke to Moses" into English ultimately is
impossible because the word "God" always carries religious-language ties,
even for nonbelievers. That appears to be a mistake, however, as I shall
explain below.
This sort of phenomenon is one that lies within ordinary English. When
we begin a story by saying, "Once upon a time .. ." all of us know that
we cannot treat what follows as having a truth value, but we also know
there are canonical restrictions on what we may say. A child does not
speak nonsense if she says, "Daddy, the little girl with the three bears
was Goldilocks, not Cinderella; you've mixed up the stories." Similarly,
some things "fit" Hamlet and others do not: that he might have worn
earrings fits, that he might have wanted to have become an Australian
sheepherder does not.
Do words in the language of the law work the way "God" and "once
upon a time" do? Hart essentially says "corporation" does. 126 That is what
he means when he says "will," "can," etc. suffer a "shift in meaning" when
we use them in conjunction with "corporation." Hence, when a caterer
says, "The Chrysler Corporation ordered three vegetarian dinners for the
121 I will distinguish this from the language of religion.
126 See § II. A., supra.
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banquet, so reduce the steak dinners by three," all of a sudden each word
after "corporation" has shifted in meaning. As I explained earlier, this is
a mistake. Someone might think to avoid the mistake by saying that,
just as "God" "blocks" certain questions about how God spoke, the word
"corporation" at least "blocks" a sentence such as "The Chrysler Corpo-
ration had three vegetarian dinners last night" and explain that a cor-
poration's being a person is a legal construct, a legal fiction; hence
corporations do not eat, do not swallow, do not die, and so on.
I have news. Out in the hinterland, away from lawyers and law schools,
corporations swallow each other up, sometimes eating them alive, only
to find they have swallowed undigestible poison pills, which sometimes
kill them off, and they are then dead and buried. This is the way we talk.
Do not say, "Ah, that's metaphorical." It is not, although sometimes it
may be idiomatic. If you and I are lucky, our quarrels will be dead and
buried, and we may merge our lives into one by marrying.
Consider again, then, "God spoke to Moses." In what sense is this sen-
tence not in English? In what sense is it part of a technical language?
Of course it is English, ordinary English, as is the rest of the Bible (or
the Koran or Mao's Little Red Book, and so on). There is no "translation
failure" in getting "God spoke to Moses" "into" English; it is English.
That of course does not mean its meaning should be crystal clear and
without mystery; nor does it mean theologians do not speak technically
among themselves when they are talking about religious matters. Nor
does it mean we do not need to surround "God made this rainbow" with
theories. Nor, most emphatically, does it mean we cannot fall into disa-
greement about the meaning of "God" or of "God made this rainbow."'
127
When we do give theories we will construct theoretical terms that we
will use with some precision. The language of religion itself, however, is
ordinary English or ordinary Hebrew or ordinary Greek, and so on.
Armed with these insights and clarifications, I am now ready to describe
technical languages in greater detail and to begin the analysis of the
language of the law. The shortest gloss of my view is that the language
of the law is like the language of religion and unlike the language of
physics.
D. Critical Recapitulation and a Third View
Hart's constitutive approach, taken as a mode of defining technical
languages, is too counter-intuitive because it is not sufficiently expansive.
The languages of the law and of baseball turn out to be technical under
that approach; but, under the principle of a rose-is-a-rose-is-a-rose, the
languages of mathematics, physics, and the other sciences are not tech-
nical languages, except insofar as these latter languages involve proce-
dural terms for doing the sciences. That does not fit the way we talk at
127 If our disagreements are sufficiently great and strongly held, we may fall
into different religious practices.
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all. That is, the languages we pre-analytically are most sure are technical
languages are those of physics, chemistry, astronomy, and so on.
Hart's view does suggest, however, albeit obliquely, what makes sci-
entific procedural terms technical, namely that they lay down what counts
as, for example, and to speak very loosely, an experiment. Scientists use
"experiment" in a much more confined way than ordinary language users
do, and their rules for conducting experiments - requiring verifiability
through independent confirmation and repetition, and so on - specify
the meaning of "experiment" for science or for their particular sciences.
Further, the laws of gravity, red shifts, etc. exist even if we do not (the
rose-principle), but experiments do not exist unless we do exist and do
lay down the procedures for conducting them. Scientists' procedural terms
thus are constitutive terms in Hart's sense and, therefore, are technical
terms in his sense.128 Of course, scientists cannot lay down just any old
rules for conducting experiments and still produce the scientific truths
we know, whereas we may lay down whatever rules for baseball we like
and have baseball or some other game.
On this range, law's procedural terms are in between those of science
and of baseball. Scientist's procedural terms are dictated by something
into having particular contours. That something may be the nature of
our minds or the limits of our understanding, or it may be the nature of
natural laws or of mathematico-scientific truth. We cannot come to, can-
not find and know we have found, mathematical or scientific truth by
talking among ourselves and laying down the laws. Rather, these truths
are independent of us in some fundamental sense that even the Copen-
hagen school of quantum physics would recognize; and to ensure that we
have arrived at them, we must conduct proofs or experiments that meet
certain conditions. The procedural terms of any game, however, may be
anything we like, e.g., how many referees or umpires, where they stand,
who has what jurisdiction, etc. Which procedures we lay down affect "what
game" we play, just as what other rules we lay down affects what the
game is. Because there is no thing any game is independent of what we
say the game is, however, nothing constrains us in laying down the terms
unless we want to construct the baseball game, the chess game, and so
on. Even here, we know we can change the rules and still have the game;
we can move the pitcher's mound up and out, change the ball, change
the third-base line, and so on.
For the procedural terms of the law there appear to be some constraints,
given that substantive laws are what they are. Having created substan-
tive law that recognizes a right to exclude others from real property to
128 1 am explaining here how we may adapt Hart's technical language view
so as to make some terms of the sciences be technical terms, namely by focusing
on his constitutive-definition view. I ultimately am dissatisfied with his view,
because it still is too under-and-over-inclusive, and I prefer to describe physicists'
and psychologists' uses of "experiment" as technical uses of the ordinary English
word "experiment." My preference here stems in part from the view of technical
terms I develop later in this section, however; and I here am trying to make plain
how and how far Hart's view can take us. I set out Hart's view in § II. A. and
the notion of making technical uses of language in § I. C.
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which someone holds title, for example, we need a mode of protecting that
right and, therefore, need something like an ejectment action, which is
nothing more than one procedure among many possible procedures for
protecting the right. The right also is a qualified right, and we therefore
also need ways to cut it off through, for example, statutes of limitations
and so on. We did not have to have the substantive rules we do have; had
we not created them, we would be a different sort of society and a different
people. But that is a phenomenon like the one with games. There still
would be a game if we created game rules and called it "baseball" even
if it were not baseball as we now know it, and vice versa if we called it
something else, etc. For the law, as long as we hold a particular theory
of rights and recognize certain rights, we have to have modes of protecting
those rights, i.e., procedures of a certain sort. Within the sort we still
have choices, however, in a more ample sense than physicists have. We
may not be able to choose to protect life and property rights by hue-and-
cry methods today (because our views have changed), but we may choose
between having certain rules of evidence and other rules of evidence and
still stay within the parameters set by the rights we recognize in crime
victims and the ones we recognize in crime defendants. This is even more
clearly true in, for example, tort. We need not have a trial tort system.
Rather, we could redress all tortious wrongs through government largess
or insurance. The latter two procedures change some of our substantive
views, but not much more than changing the third-base line changes
baseball.
Hart's constitutive view thus allows us to be clear about how the pro-
cedural words of the law may be described as technical. We cannot get
more for the law than that out of his view, however, and the languages
of mathematics and the sciences are not technical, except for their pro-
cedural, i.e., doing, words. We need to look further for a theory for the
language of the law.
Caton's mode of defining technical languages - by cross-reference to
participants in a discipline, occupation, or activity and to words that do
not have an ordinary language meaning (use) at all or have a different
one than the ordinary ones - however, either has something missing or
is too broad. His examples of technical languages include the languages
of chess, as would Hart's, and, unlike Hart's, Caton's approach captures
as technical the languages of mathematics and physics. 2 9 This list better
fits our intuitions in including the latter as technical languages, and their
terms initially appear to fit the two types of technical terms he identifies.
But the terms of chess are not so obviously of either type.130 Moreover,
Caton includes the language of farming as a technical language; and,
although our intuitions about whether the language of farming is a tech-
nical language give out at this point (as they always do in middle cases),
we find we are in some trouble if we say the dressage "ring" or the farmer's
"field" is a technical term in either of his two senses."3 Too much becomes
129See § II. B., supra.
"I See § II. B., supra.
131 Only the second sense is even a possibility of course.
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technical, and part of the problem here stems from his having defined
technical languages by cross-reference to participants of a "discipline or
occupation or activity."
We know what prompts him to use this cross-reference; we all have
had the experience of hearing a conversation among enthusiasts of some-
thing about which we know little and having that conversation go around
us or over our heads. Moreover, Caton's enterprise-point is to de-mystify
technical languages by getting us to see that we ourselves know a lot of
technical languages: ways of talking about activities, for example, that
not everyone knows because they know little or nothing about those
activities. He would not be concerned, then, that "too much" becomes
technical because being technical merely is a part-relational property
between words and certain people, not something about the words them-
selves. The other part-relational property is between the way these cer-
tain people use those words and the way the rest of us use those words.
Here he identifies two they-we configurations: First, they use a word
that we do not use at all; for example, physicists use "quark," but we do
not use "quark" unless we are "speaking physics." That is, "quark" has
no ordinary English uses; it is, so to speak, an arbitrary word from the
view of ordinary English and, as I have explained earlier,132 is a theo-
retical word, i.e., is the word for a theoretical entity. (This, of course, does
not mean such entities are not "real" entities. Rather, it means they are
known through theory.) The same is true of "quasar;" the Motorola tel-
evision people are not using an astrophysicist's word, although the TV
people wish subliminally to make that connection. The second they-we
configuration Caton identifies is the one in which they use a word that
we also use, but the way they use it is not the way we use it in ordinary
language. Their use, then, is cut off from ours. Here he gives the example
of algebra's "ring."
Yet algebra's "ring" does not seem to be an example of a word "not
having in ordinary language the senses given them in the discipline in
question" because the substantial sense of algebra's "ring" is one our
"ring" has in ordinary language. The ordinary "ring" perhaps does not
have all the senses algebra's "ring" has (and vice versa);13 3 but they share
a fundamental sense although this may not be obvious. The algebraist's
"ring" started out its life in mathematics in connection with solving prob-
lems of transformations of vector space by transforming the problems into
linear equations instead of continuing with the Cartesian method of rep-
resenting numbers geometrically and carrying out operations geometri-
cally or instead of using matrix rectangular arrays of numbers, and so
on. Once von Neumann introduced rings of operators, algebra became the
tool for quantum physics and is continuous with geometry in a sense
Descartes might recognize. In short and more clearly, mathematicians
132 See § II. C., supra.
.. Caton's text is not clear as to whether this is his point or whether he
means to say our sense and the mathematician's sense are wholly different al-
though we each use words that look the same.
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used and still use "ring" instead of "sofa" or "shelf" because the geometric
curve for the set of integers is a 360 degree curve, which in plane geometry
is like the age-rings of a tree if we allow for geometry's curve's not having
any width. Hence, the mathematician's "ring" in substantial part is one
of the senses of our "ring." This is something like the poultry tradist's
"chicken" vis-a-vis our "chicken, ' 1 34 although there is an important dif-
ference I shall explain in a moment.
Nor is this story of the mathematicians' "ring" unique; the relation of
their "group" to our "group" is even plainer. They use "group" for the set
of natural numbers taken together with an associative binary operation,
such that the result of applying the operation to an element of the set
with the unity element is the first element and to an element of the set
and its inverse element of the set is the unity element. 13 5 Put this way,
we might easily miss that they use "group" in a sense that is fundamental
to the way we use it. To use "group" of something in English there must
be an associative relation of some sort for the members of the group -
group of people, group of people in the room, group of shouting people in
the room, group of shouting people in the room having their picture taken,
and so on. 136 This does not mean the mathematician's "group" is not a
technical term; it most emphatically is. They use that word in sentences
that Horatio would never dream of using and would not grasp without
learning mathematics. But their use is connected at this level with the
way we use it. (The same is true, of course, with their uses of "associative
relation" and ours.) When they get to the "outer perimeters" of their uses
of "group," their uses may well be cut off from ours in the sense that only
by understanding mathematics could we trace back from these outer-
134 See § I. C., supra.
31 That is, a group is the set of natural numbers together with a binary
operation (one that operates on two numbers at a time) that is associative (i.e.,
the equation reads with any pairings), such that the result of an operation on
any element in the set with the unity element e in the set is the original element
[as in 6 x 1 = 6 or -6 x 1 = -6] and such that the result of operating any element
in the set by its inverse element in the set is equal to the unity element e [as in
6 x 1/6 = 1 or -6 x 1/-6 = 1]. That is, for natural numbers a, b, c, ... and binary
operation 0/, with unity element e and an inverse element a-1 for each element
a, a group G is defined as follows:
G = {a, b, c.... I with (a, b) O/ = a * b such that
(1) a*(b*c) = (a*b)*c
(2) a*e = a
(3) a * a-1 = e
See, e.g., W. BARNES, supra note 117, at 17. Of course, this definition not only
defines this group; here it specifies the operation in such a way as to specify
multiplication as the meaning of" * ". What this group G is, is a set of numbers
that group together under multiplication in a certain (here, the usual) way. More
importantly, any set of anything that functions this way under any operation is
a group, and this is the reason abstract algebra is valuable to physics.
136 1 find using "group" easier than using "ring" and herewith switch to it. I
will use it to draw some distinctions Caton did not draw and, more importantly,
to rectify what I have suggested are defects in his view. He, of course, may be
more nearly right than I; and those who prefer his definitions to mine may be
able to construct a sense for "technical language of the law" more nearly to their
liking than mine may be for them.
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perimeter uses to the algebraic "group" I have just described and make
a connection between our "group" and theirs. When their uses are that
far out, are cut off, the term is technical in the sense of "not having in
ordinary language the senses given them in the discipline in question"
because the word will have picked up new, nonordinary meanings and
attenuated further its ordinary-language connection on its outward jour-
ney.
In the meantime, however, we have three types of technical terms: (1)
terms that never have had ordinary uses because they are not from or-
dinary language at all and instead are from theories (physics' "quark");
(2) terms that once were connected to ordinary words at least marginally
by using one among many of the meanings of the ordinary word but today
function in theories that undergird the other uses (algebra's "group" today
in its most extreme uses); and (3) terms that have uses in the discipline
that are fixed to one among the many uses of the ordinary word, i.e., that
are fixed on one out of the many meanings of the ordinary language word
(algebra's "group" at its lowest level). Now the question is whether, for
example, the poultry tradist's "chicken" is such a technical word. It is
fixed on one among many of the meanings of the ordinary word "chicken."
If this word is a technical word, then all of the language of the law is
open to being technical.
Some theorists appear to be willing to allow that definition (3) of tech-
nical terms is sufficiently complete, 37 and I myself have taken that view
once; 138 but I no longer am convinced it is not subject to an infelicity of
the "too much becomes technical" sort, as well as other sorts of prob-
lems. 3 9 When I keep the mathematician's abstract algebra uses of "group"
in view and close my eyes for the moment to the ways in which that term
can move from a category (3) technical term to a category (2) technical
term, one of the things that strikes me about all three categories of
technical terms is that they are associated with theories of mathematics,
physics, chemistry, and so on. Not all the theoretical terms of these dis-
ciplines fall into one of these three categories, of course, because not all
of their theoretical terms are technical;140 but, apart from their procedural
"doing" terms, their technical terms are theoretical, too. The poultry
tradist's use of "chicken," on the other hand, is so ordinary, so intuitively
nontechnical, that we should be reluctant to include it in a group with
the mathematician's "group" even of type (3). One way of separating
"group" from "chicken" along principled lines, then, is to require that a
category (3) technical term also be a theoretical term. Unless it functions
as part of a theory, as algebra is a theory about numbers as well as of
other things, or unless a theory undergirds the fixing on one-among-many
meanings, the term is not category (3) technical.
See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent, supra note 6, at 586 n.35.
' See Schauer, Essay, supra note 2, at 804 n.26 (citing Morrison, Technical
Language (and the Law), 10 COLONIAL LAW. 18 (1980) (out of print)).
119 See text following note 116, supra, discussing "J'adoube."
140 See discussion of the biologist's "cell": nontechnical but theoretical term
in § II. C., supra.
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Yet someone may say this will not separate "group" and "chicken"
because the poultry tradist does have a "theory" undergirding the mean-
ing-fixation, namely that young birds are better for broiling and frying
than old birds, which are suitable only for stewing. The answer to that
point is that this is too loose a use of "theory;" for there is only fact or
explanation here, not theory at all in any sense in which we regularly
use the word "theory." Theories do explain; moreover, they explain facts
(or, rather, truths and laws), but they also embody laws or themselves
are laws or make recourse to law. Of course, this reply appears to depend
on making a fixed-meaning use of "theory;" for some people do say, "I
have a theory about why she always comes late to class; she does not
have a watch." That is an explanation of one fact through another fact
by way of an unstated premise about a causal connection, and even that
unstated premise does not leave the factual realm. But, this overlooks
the distinction we mark in English by the difference between "theory"
and "explanation." What we should say about this so-called "theory" that
she is late because she has no watch is that the speaker ought to have
said, "I have an explanation for her lateness.
141
Similarly, the objection that the poultry tradist's "chicken" is under-
girded by theory ineluctably overlooks that the very fact upon which the
argument trades itself is bound up in the meaning of the poultry tradist's
"chicken." Words have networks of meaning, and some aspects of these
networks are facts. 142 Of the two sense of "chicken," generic and young-
versus-old, the latter has "meaning facts" that are not simply temporal.
That is, "(young) chicken" is not simply equivalent to" 'chicken' (generic)
plus 'less than a year old."' Rather, we also use "chicken" for ordering a
broiler or fryer from the butcher. One of the facts about young chickens
is that these are the uses to which we regularly put them. To pretend
that the meaning of "young chicken" or of "chicken" does not "network"
into that regular-purpose fact is to ignore how we use "chicken." If mean-
141 That is, a careful speaker would not have used "theory" at all. If that is
correct, then my point that "theory" cannot occur only with facts stands, and I
have not used a technical term in using "theory" as I do. In that event, I do not
need the second, controversial argument in the text. I give both arguments be-
cause I have discovered, first, that some people believe an ordinary-language
argument/philosophy is "stuck" with how everyone talks, including the dim-wit-
ted; second, that my uses of English sometimes deviate from those of my learned
colleagues who, for example, believe they can promise me that they will publish
an unsolicited-yet-to-be-written article in the Harvard Law Review (evidently by
writing an article so brilliant that it overbears the independent judgment of the
Review's editors); and third, that lawyers never are content with just one argu-
ment to establish a point unless it is writ in an official report they have read and
can cross-check now. I make no apology for drawing the theory/explanation dis-
tinction - it is a distinction that is there in ordinary English to use when we
need it as I do now. I return to this last point in §§ III. B. and III. C., infra.
"I See generally Morrison, From Logical Atoms to Language Networks: An
Examination of Part Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois, Urbana) (1981). I argued there, for example, that someone
who does not know unicorns are mythical creatures does not understand how the
rest of us use "unicorn," i.e. does not know our meaning of "unicorn." This, ob-
viously, is a controversial view, for it ultimately really threatens the analytic-
synthetic distinction.
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ing is use, then we cannot ignore what I shall call here the network
meaning-fact; and that in turn means the argument that the poultry
tradist's use of "chicken" is undergirded by theory is mistaken. The mis-
take is in using "theory" for an explanation that never leaves the realm
of facts; i.e., the mistake is in thinking the fact of broiler/fryer regular-
purpose for a young chicken is news of anything more than the definition,
the meaning of, "chicken" for poultry tradists and for ourselves when we
want to buy a broiler or fryer.
Hence, the poultry tradist's "chicken" is not a technical term under
category (3) because it is not a theoretical term. When the poultry tradist
uses "chicken" for broilers and fryers, however, the poultry tradist does
put the ordinary language word "chicken" to a technical use, in the "set-
tled preference for one among many meanings" sense I explored earlier.143
If the trades people maintain this use by insisting upon exactness among
themselves, the word will continue to have a useful life as a word put to
a technical use.144 Its technicality, however, should not lead anyone into
thinking that nonparticipants are or can be cut-off from the meaning of
the word even in the poultry tradist's mouth. That cannot happen because,
even when put to technical use, the word as so used is an ordinary lan-
guage word.
This final point allows us to recast the one with which I began this
section, namely the nature of procedural (i.e., "doing") terms. We do not
have to be content with using Hart's constitutive approach as an expla-
nation for the technicality of these words, yet we will be able to leave
the words in the control of the participant-users of the words, i.e., the
chemist for laboratory procedure words, the lawyer for law's procedure
words. We may say that, just as the poultry tradist makes a technical
use of "chicken," so too the lawyer makes a technical use of "collateral
14 See § I. C., supra.
144 As I noted earlier, see § I. C., supra, words can move off the technical-
term list; they also may move off a technical-use list. They do when the word no
longer is useful as a technical word because ordinary people have adopted the
word as their own, taking all or some of its technical meaning as the primary
meaning for everyday purposes. This has happened to "neurosis," and someone
may wonder why it has not happened to, for example, "electron." There are at
least four reasons. First, "electron" in the mouths of physicists is protected by a
very solid theory, whereas the theory surrounding "neurosis" not only was not
universally accepted but also was not itself solid. Part of the trouble with Freudian
theory is that it has an answer for each question. That is, it is not open to
falsification, but the hallmark of science is exactly that its truths are falsifiable,
although that strikes oddly on the ear to hear. See generally K. POPPER, THE OPEN
SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). Second, when we use words such as
"electronic ignition" we are coming linguistically from "electricity" at a time
when no one knew about the flow of electrons; hence, physicists can treat our
uses of "electro[ ]" as not threatening their uses. Third, "electron" is the word for
something we know exists. And, fourth, all of us know this much science today:
that "electron" is a scientific term for a particular part of an atom. In sum, just
because "everyone" is a 'participant" in some sense for the use of a word does
not mean democracy rules and ordinary people get to dictate the meaning of the
term. Rather, we can use the physicist's "electron" but it belongs to the physicist,
who controls it through well developed theories of physics. Or, we can use our
own "electro[ ]," but then we are not "speaking physics."
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estoppel" or "interpleader" or "quiet title," as well as of "abatement" or
"trespass" or "nuisance."
Consider "trespass," "nuisance," and "abatement." Most of us learned
those words when we were very young children when, for example, our
parents taught us the Lord's Prayer ("And forgive those who trespass
against us"), told us to stop pestering them with questions when they
were trying to do something else ("Stop making a nuisance of yourself'),
or shouted to us to cut out the noise ("Abate that racket!"). Lawyers have
more refined or more exact uses of "trespass," "nuisance," and "abate-
ment," but the core of their meaning is available to all speakers of or-
dinary English. They make a technical use of an ordinary English word
by taking care in their deployment to pick up some, but not all, the
ordinary meanings.
With words of procedure, lawyers have a more open hand because or-
dinary language users do not have occasion to use the procedural words
of the law unless they come to court. When they then return to "civilian"
life and use those words, they tend to be less exact than lawyers are and
their expansions now work to put the lawyer's use in a technical light.
This will strike some people as highly counter-intuitive. For them I
offer as two cases-in-point the words "appeal" and "guilty." How often
have all of us heard nonlawyer friends speak of a tort defendant's having
been found guilty? With "appeal" the looseness with which nonlawyers
talk is even more apparent. They talk about appealing to the Supreme
Court when there is no federal question, or to the state supreme court
when the trial is not over, and so on. They use "appeal" without distin-
guishing, for example, between a writ of certiorari and an appeal-of-right.
There is nothing improper about that; "appeal" is to "appeal" and "cer-
tiorari" as "chicken" is to "chicken" and "young chicken" or as "umpire"
is to "umpire" and "referee."
Even if procedural terms of any discipline, occupation, or activity con-
stitute a fourth category of technical terms, that does not leave the law
with much on which to hang a technical-language hat. We can use Hart's
constitutive view to justify saying the procedural terms of the language
of the law are technical, but we cannot extend that view to more of legal
language without admitting the view is inadequate because the central
terms of the languages of the physical sciences and mathematics are not
technical under that view. Alternatively, we can say the procedural terms
of the law are ordinary language terms put to technical uses and mean
by this nothing more mysterious than that there are niceties of use for
"appeal" in talking about the law that lawyers need to and do mark in
their careful speech. Others safely can use "appeal" in a more-or-less way
until they need to participate closely with the law. Then they, too, will
need to be more exact, i.e., will need better to mark those nice distinctions
and to put "appeal" to technical use, which they can learn to do without
having to learn anything about, for example, justiciability.
This also is true of many "substantive" terms, such as "trespass," "nui-
sance," or "abatement." One of the crucial terms of contract law, on the
other hand, does not have even the technical-use technicality in the lan-
guage of the law. For "promise" is an ordinary English word bench and
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bar use exactly as do ordinary-English speakers. This may strike some
lawyers as news, and they consequently may doubt my claim. I, therefore,
sketch why "promise" is a "fully ordinary word used fully ordinarily" in
the law in the next part of this article. I will also examine the nature of
law's use of "speech" in first amendment cases. This word appears to be
not only put to a technical use in either the different-deployment sense
or the fixed-on-one-among-many-meanings sense, but also to be a term
that is part of a theory. I attempt to explain, however, that this appearance
is deceptive in that even those uses of words that do not qualify as "speech"
under the first amendment also are not speech in ordinary English. Upon
completing these further analyses I give of "promise" and "speech," I will
rest my case on the nature of legal language. I then will conclude this
article with some general comments about how lawyers may talk to other
lawyers.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
A. Due Process Revisited
Under the views of Hart and Caton, the language of the law is a tech-
nical language. Without regard to any of the problems I have uncovered
for their views - and I have found a number of significant ones - this
gives reason to believe the language of the law is technical in a sense
more interesting than that the procedural terms are technical. In par-
ticular, under each view, the technicality they identify is of the "experts
only" sort I railed against at the beginning of this article. Hart and Caton
get to this "experts only" point by significantly different routes, but they
fundamentally agree that to understand how lawyers talk to each other,
including how judges talk to lawyers and vice versa, the rest of us have
to go to law school in some sense or other. That is, we have to learn the
law, just as we have to learn (some) chess or (some) physics if we are to
"speak (some) chess" or "speak (some) physics.' ' 45
In the last section I conceded that the procedural terms of the language
of the law may be technical terms in Hart's constitutive sense or in Caton's
participants' sense. I opted, however, in favor of saying these terms are
41 I may have taken some liberties with Caton's view; his five pages is not
sufficient for me to tell whether my analytic extrapolations of his views fail to
do him justice. The problem, again, fundamentally, is the problem of knowing
whether the two kinds of technical terms he describes form the boundary on the
participants' definition and, if so, what we are to say about some of the examples
he gives of technical languages that do not fit within that boundary. In any event,
the "go to law school" sense for him clearly need not be strong. Rather, he would
say each of us absorbs this much law as part of being on the scene while we grow
up and as we participate in society as adults. In the long run, he and I do not
disagree about that ultimate point, but our explanations of the phenomenon differ.
That is, he appears to believe we cannot but help learning this much of the
technical language of the law, while I am arguing we cannot help but understand
the law because it is in ordinary English and cannot help but learn the law
because we read widely and because the law stems from ourselves, including the
ways we talk.
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ordinary language terms put to technical use either in the form of dif-
ferent deployment or in the form of one-among-many meanings. Under
my view, "appeal" or "interpleader" is no more a technical term than is
the poultry tradists' "chicken." I further argued the same is true of such
more substantive terms as "trespass," "nuisance," and "abatement;" and
the meanings with which the law uses these terms consequently are vastly
more available to any ordinary speaker of ordinary English than are
terms such as physics' "quark" or algebra's "ring" because the legal terms
entirely are in ordinary English.
But, of course, saying this much does not test all of legal language. If
I looked further I might find "real" technical legal terms. Moreover, my
argument depends upon saying that a term is not a technical term if it
is only a technical-use term in the different-deployment or one-among-
many senses; and ipse dixit never is a substitute for analytic truth.
Why not say that technical-use terms are technical terms? My answer
for the language of the law is that due process constrains us because
technical terms can become cut off from ordinary language, hence from
ordinary speakers of ordinary language, but due process requires that
the law be available to each of us without the intercessional aid of someone
who is trained in the law.
This due process consideration is of no concern for poultry tradists
because they have their own natural constraint against having their
technical-use terms become cut off from ordinary language and ordinary
folk. There are so many overlapping participants' groups - from supplier
to farmer to retailer to customer - that needs of commerce themselves
constrain against towers of Babel. The same commercial constraints exist
in commercial law. The courts and the lawyers are not the only partici-
pants' groupings. If anything, the shoe is on the other foot here. Business
men and women and corporations and their consumer customers out-
number and "out vote" lawyers of bench and bar concerning the discourse.
The commercial groups further are in competition, hence their groups
subdivide; and they sometimes are in one subgroup (buyers), sometimes
in the other (sellers). This atmosphere prevents any one subgroup from
capturing the word and removing it from its one-among-many connections
to the ordinary language word or from making the "different deployment"
into a different word. Further, because the practitioners' groups in busi-
ness must deal with consumer-customers or deal with groups that do so
deal, and because each business man and woman and each corporate
employee ultimately also is a consumer customer, the consumer customers
are the engine that drives the machine of language. They are the ordinary
language users, who may individually know some of these technical uses
and who may concertedly adopt a technical use as their standard use,
and so on; but they also are the group with whom the other participants'
groups must remain in linguistic contact on pain of losing the cus-
tomers.146 These groups, and primarily the consuming public, dictate the
146 This, of course, raises flip-side problems for business in the area of intel-
lectual property. The business must take care to make sure that its trade name
or trade mark does not become the generic term for the thing - e.g., "Kleenex"
for facial tissues, "Coke" for colas; and some companies have lost this battle by
failing to provide ordinary English alternatives for their trade name or mark,
e.g., "aspirin."
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terms of the law for lawyers. Indeed, they do more. They dictate the law
itself.147 The immediate consequence is that, for example, "promise" is
not a technical term of the law. Rather, it is an ordinary language term
the meaning of which is determined by extra-law forces in society, par-
ticularly in commercial society. The same is true of "reasonable" in tort.
Here there are insurance companies on both sides; and there is the con-
suming public, which individually may end up on either side of a tort
dispute. As the public's notions of what is reasonable change, the legal
meaning of "reasonable" changes.
Not all of the law operates under these constraining conditions, how-
ever; and in some areas, there is danger that one participants' group will
move the technical-use word, which had been connected to the ordinary
word by the different-deployment relation or the one-among-many-mean-
ings relation, to something that is more remote, the way the mathema-
tician's "ring" is more remote, or to something that completely is cut off,
as (but not the way) the physicist's "quark" is cut off from ordinary
English. There is no danger when mathematicians and physicists use
those kinds of technical terms for at least two reasons; seeing why will
give us insight to remaining areas of legal language.
First, and most basically, the way mathematicians and physicists talk
among themselves has no bearing on the lives of the public except insofar
as we bear the financial and moral costs of their work and thus need to
know what they are doing. Yet that is not much of a constraint. They
may talk scientific Yiddish in the back of their laboratories as long as
they talk English out front when they come to us with funding requests.
This would be like saying lawyers may talk Law French or LawSpeak in
court as long as they speak English in their offices to clients. But there
is an obvious difference, which destroys the analogy of the language of
the law to those of physics and mathematics. In court, the very same sort
of people sit in the jury box as sit on the client's side of the office desk.
And there is more. The whole point of "lawyers' law" is to lay down
standards that apprise the persons subject to those standards of what the
standards are. This particularly is true in criminal law for obvious prac-
tical reasons even if we had no due process clause. But, due process does
require the law to stay in linguistic contact with ordinary language speak-
ers. Further, the people are the source of the law; that is not true of
physics or mathematics. The law better not be in Law French or Law-
Speak then.
Second, mathematicians' and physicists' technical terms are parts of
theories, well-articulated theories, and the most general and most central
of the technical terms may be "unpacked and repackaged" for the general
(and often inexact) consumption of nonmathematicians and nonphysi-
cists. Using the technical terms allows mathematicians and physicists to
speak in more precise, more comprehensible (for them) ways using fewer
147 There is a fundamental sense in which Judge (formerly professor) Posner
has the role of courts backwards when he says that their role in contracts cases,
for example, is to normalize terms. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Of LAW (2d
ed. 1977).
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words and taking less time. Most importantly, they also have independent
constraints on their theories through the requirements of proof and ex-
periment, of coherence and completeness. That their technical words are
cut off from ours, then, presents no issue of moment to society.
May the law similarly develop technical terms that are cut off from
ordinary language, by being very remote or by being completely arbitrary
or may it have technical terms that only obliquely connect to our uses,
as long as the law surrounds the term with theory? And does the law do
this? The answer is, the law may not and does not, although there are
terms in the law that are surrounded by theory. Being a theoretical term
in the law is not like being one of Hart's constitutive terms, however;
rather, the theory for the term comes from ordinary language itself and
sometimes from a prescriptive view of society, the general contours of
which we ourselves have laid down. This is the topic of the next sections.
B. Ordinary Language as a Source of Theory: "Promise"
There are distinctions within ordinary language that govern the proper
use of the word "promise." These distinctions also are the ones lawyers
and the law mark with "promise" - all legal promises are ordinary
promises. Yet "promise" functions in some unusual ways in ordinary
English compared to the noun "table" or to the verb "walk," and there is
a mode of describing these unusual features of "promise" that will give
us a notion of how ordinary English itself embodies distinctions that
appear to be theory-laden distinctions when these same points arise in
connection with the law's use of "speech" in first amendment cases. When
the Supreme Court and commentators try to explain, for example, why
burning a draft card to protest the war in Viet Nam is not speech but
wearing an armband is, they find themselves making recourse to a notion
about "symbolic speech."148 That smacks immediately of theory-construc-
tion; and this impression deepens when we notice that the law draws
distinctions between obscene speech and merely-dirty speech by saying
the former is not speech at all, and so on. My aim in this section and the
next one is to make plain that the theory at stake in the so-called "sym-
bolic speech" cases is not the Court's theory but that of ordinary English
itself. The Court, however, sometimes finds itself on the cutting-edge of
societal problems and thus at a point that is slightly ahead of ordinary
English and ordinary people. The Court cannot wait for our language to
catch up and solve the problem; it must decide the case. In resolving the
issue before it, the Court then points the way for future development of
ordinary English; and, if the Court is successful, the way the Court uses
"speech" never is cut-off from ordinary English because ordinary members
of our society internalize the Court's cutting-edge use. Further, the
Court's resolution turns on the Court's role as prescriptive interpreter of
the first amendment, and the role we have set for the Court then is to
tell us where we are going as it interprets "speech" under first-amendment
guarantees.
I'l See § III. C., supra.
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But this is the end of the story, and I need to begin at the beginning.
That is the point at which a court plays a descriptive-institutional role
and where ordinary English and the ordinary practices our linguistic
distinctions mark reign by being fully adequate to the questions before
a court by already embodying the distinctions for resolving the dispute.149
More than a generation ago, J.L. Austin described the ways in which
"promise" in some of its uses differs from all of our uses of "walk."150 When
we use the verb "promise" in the nonhabitual, noncontinuous, first-person.
singular, present tense, to say "I promise that p" or "I hereby promise
that p"151 is to promise that p, where p is a proposition or nominalized
sentence although there are constraints on the propositional content of
p, as we shall see. To say "I walk to the store" is not thereby to walk, but
to describe truly or falsely; "I did promise" is not to promise, but to report;
and "I see that you are happy" is not to see, and so on. To say "I promise
to pay" is to promise to pay. Nor is "promise" the only verb with this
feature in this use. Other such verbs include "bet," "swear," "name,"
"demand," "order," "declare" (as to customs officials). Austin calls the
verbs that have this feature "performative verbs" and their featured uses
"performative verb speech acts." He also identifies two kinds of conditions
that surround these verbs; if the conditions are not met, the speech act
is "unhappy" or it "misfires." The reason for using "is unhappy" or "mis-
fires" is that performative verb speech acts are neither true nor false.
This is an important feature of their nature as a distinct class of uses of
language.
For example, a sergeant usually has authority to order troops to fire
during battle. She does this by saying "Fire!" or "I order you to fire."
Consider the situations in which she says "I order you to fire!" to a civilian
or to troops who have no firearms. We say there is no order in the former
situation, even if she believed the civilian to be a trooper; her speech act
"misfires." There is an order to the troopers, as long as she does not know
the troopers have no firearms, but the order is "unhappy," i.e., we would
say it is an ineffective order, which differs from being ineffective as an
order. All of these distinctions flow straight out of the way we would talk
about the situations and are undergirded by our shared understandings.
Societal issues loom large on certain situations, of course, and may exceed
our shared understandings. If the sergeant orders troops to fire upon
women and babies, for example, we may fall into disagreement among
ourselves as to whether there is an order.1 5 2
We mark similar sorts of distinctions with regard to "I promise." More-
149 1 am talking of a particular kind of problem here, not all legal issues.
150 J. AUSTIN, supra note 24. See also Austin, Other Minds, PRoc. ARisTo-
TELIAN Soc., Supp. Vol. (1964), reprinted in J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
(1961).
-5' The word "hereby" functions as a double-check for a performative use of
a verb.
152 This was especially pressing in Vietnam. The sticking point is over
whether and when reasonable troops may view people who are not clad in con-
ventional mufti as likely to be carrying concealed explosives. That we do not have
a settled description on the misfire-unhappy spectrum for this sort of case is the
result of and a sign of our not having settled yet the political and moral issues.
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over, those distinctions control our uses of "She promised" and related
words in ways that exactly comport with how lawyers talk about promises,
and the following is a partial ordinary-language map of contract law: We
do not say there was a promise unless we can drive a temporal wedge
between apparently promising words and keeping the promise; lawyers
say this by saying there is no promise in a present barter-and-exchange.
15 3
In order to speak of express or implied promises such as express or implied
warranties, lawyers and the rest of us adhere to this temporal-wedge rule
by expanding the time-frame.1 5 4 Similarly, ordinary English users mark
the distinction between failing to keep a promise out of negligence or
deliberate choice, on the one hand, and failing to keep it for unavoidable
reasons, on the other hand, by saying an apology is due for the former
but only an explanation is due for the latter. We also say explanations
are due if there is a misunderstanding and, if the misunderstanding is
legitimate, the explanation functions to excuse failing to keep the prom-
ise; if not, we say there is an apology due. We describe someone who
promises without intending to keep her word as having given an insincere
promise but, because there is a promise, we can demand an apology when
she fails to keep the promise.
Further there are uses of "I promise" that we, as speakers of ordinary
English, say are not promises at all. One is the use of apparently prom-
ising words in circumstances when there cannot be a promise because
the speaker cannot be giving her word. For example, to say "I promise
to buy you a new collar" to a dog or "I promise to pay Sally" to the air
is not to promise because the speaker cannot intend her words to be taken
by another to be the giving of an assurance that she will do as she says.
These may be resolutions, but they are not promises. The same is true
when one says "I promise" to oneself. We also all know that when someone
accepts a dinner invitation by saying, "I promise to come," there is no
promise. We do not surround social situations with the seriousness nec-
essary for us to say there is a giving of an assurance here, hence we do
not take the words to be promising words even if she uses "promise."
(Repeatedly saying "I'll be there" in response to requests for assurance,
however, is promising in ordinary English, even if she never uses the
word "promise.")
There are many other similar ways in which we assess words among
ourselves without the help of lawyers as being or as not being promising
words. If I say, "I promise to steal from you" we all say this is no promise
because I cannot promise to do something we both know is bad for you;
we say the same if I say, "I promise not to steal from you" because we
expect no less. Further, we say someone misuses "promise" in saying she
promises to do something she and we know she cannot do or cannot bring
153 See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4 (1952).
,54 This may (often does) come as news that smacks of legal truth or legal
rule to law students; but they simply somehow have been left out of the shared
conventional understandings of the rest of us about how to talk, perhaps because
of their inexperienced youth or because they are reading the wrong things in high
school and college.
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about on her own; all she can promise here is to try her best. We also do
not treat promising words on the stage as part of a play as a promise,
and so on.
Another use of "I promise" in which ordinary-English speakers would
say there is no promise arises when the "promised" act is so venal that
society expands its understanding that I cannot promise you I will do
something we both know is harmful to you to include a regard for third
parties. Hence, we refuse to describe "I promise to murder Smith" as a
promise. Courts may express this point by saying there is an unenforce-
able promise because the subject matter of the promise is an illegal act,
but courts would be better off talking like the rest of us do and saying
there is no promise at all. There are after all some promises that are
unenforceable about which no one has the slightest hesitation in saying
there is a promise - for example, where I promised but unforseen cir-
cumstances prevent me from keeping the promise, or in the law when a
statute of limitations has run (the ordinary language equivalent here is
"You're too late; too much time has passed and I reasonably thought you
were not going to ask me to keep that promise"). These situations differ
substantially from "I promise to murder Smith."
I now come to the situation that appears to refute my claim that all
legal promises are ordinary language promises. There are cases in which
the law recognizes promises-by-behavior. Upon explaining how even these
cases fit our ordinary language uses of "promise," I will have completed
dressing the stage to turn to "speech" in the first amendment.
The hard case is exemplified in Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co. 155 In 1955 Ford contracted with Allied to purchase some ma-
chinery for Ford's employees to install at one of Ford's plants. In 1956
Ford submitted another contract proposal to Allied to purchase more of
such machinery, but with the change that Allied's employees would install
this machinery. Under the first contract, Allied did not indemnify Ford
for acts of negligence by Ford's employees; but under the second proposed
contract, a broad indemnity clause would have made Allied indemnify
Ford for acts of negligence by Allied's employees and by Ford's employees
arising in connection with Allied's installation of the machinery. At least
two months before Allied signed this second contract, Allied began the
installation called for in the second contract. During that installation,
and before the signing of that contract, some of Ford's employees negli-
gently injured one of Allied's employees. The Allied employee sued Ford
and won.
Ford, in the course of this suit, sought to bring Allied in as a third-
party defendant, on the grounds of the broad indemnity clause of the
second contract. Allied resisted, arguing that there had been no such
contract at the time of the injury to the Allied employee, and that in any
event both Ford and Allied had intended to void the broad indemnity
clause before Allied signed the contract, thus leaving only the indemnity
clause of the first contract to indemnify acts of negligence by Allied's
employees.
155 277 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1960).
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The court found for Ford on the grounds that Allied's beginning the
performance called for under the second contract operated as an accept-
ance of Ford's offer to contract and operated as a promise to complete the
performance on those terms. That is, the court found that Allied's begin-
ning of performance was a ratification of the second contract every bit as
effective as Allied's signature would have been, and that therefore, Allied
was bound to all the terms of the second contract, including the broad
indemnity clause. To the argument that Ford was not similarly bound,
absent Allied's signature, the court said that Ford indeed also was bound
through its acquiescence in Allied's beginning of performance. Thus, Ford
would have been estopped from claiming there had been no contract
absent Allied's signature because Ford has acquiesced in Allied's perfor-
mance. What happens, then, is that behavior - actually performing on
Allied's side, acquiescing in that performance on Ford's side - results in
a contract and promises to complete performance on either side (finish
the installation, pay for the work, respectively).
Now, it appears highly counter-intuitive to say that there is any be-
havior, however finely tuned, that could amount to a promise to indemnify
someone's employees for accidents on the job. If anything ever appeared
to need language of the promising sort, this does. Moreover, how could
any behavior be so unambiguous as to be a promise to indemnify for
negligence of employees of both companies, but not be behavior that
promises to indemnify for only one company's employees? It cannot. No
nonverbal behavior can speak as clearly as words, except when the be-
havior arises against a certain kind of background. That background is
one of shared conventions. The conventions can be widespread throughout
the country, or in the community, or between Ford and Allied.
What happens in Allied is that the behavior occurs against the back-
ground of an unsigned contract in which a promise is specified. Were
Allied to do exactly what it did without this background, the court could
never have found the particular indemnity promise. There might have
been some way of making Allied indemnify Ford in that event, but this
could not have been on the basis of Allied's behavior as amounting to
this particular promise of indemnity. There would have been no such
promise. As it is, the contractual background makes Allied a promisor
by behavior. Because of this background, Allied's behavior is "promising
speech." (This last gloss wants explaining of course.)
Still, the question is not so much whether we can make sense of the
court's reasoning in deciding that there was a promise in Allied's behav-
ior, but whether there are any ordinary life examples in which behavior
is of this promising sort. The truly clear cases, however, are also cases
that have been in court, such as Allied's promise. The reason for that is
that only in such cases is there a possibility of finding an agreed con-
ventional procedure that turns behavior into such finely tuned promises.
Or, at least, these are the only ones of which we are likely publicly to
hear. But family members and close friends often over the years manage
to work out such procedures among themselves; hence, such cases as
Allied do not embody counter-examples to my claim that all promises the
law recognizes as promises are ones ordinary speakers of ordinary English
will say are promises.
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Moreover, I can offer analysis that bolsters this analysis. Usually when
we engage in a performative verb speech act we do something more than
utter words. At christenings, we sprinkle babies and smash champagne
bottles on ships' hulls. When we bet, we put money down or throw a chip
into the pot. When we order someone to do something or order food at a
restaurant, we often point to something. 156 When we swear to something,
whether officially or unofficially, we usually hold up a hand, fingers and
thumb straight and together, and palm facing out. 15 7 These nonoral, non-
written elements of the performative verb speech act are not always
essential to the act; but, as Austin says, sometimes the act seems somehow
incomplete without them. 158
Just as some performative verb speech acts can be effectuated without
any nonoral or nonwritten act elements, yet sometimes seem to need
those latter elements, so too sometimes these latter elements can be
complete replacements for the oral or written elements. For example,
usually when we bet we say we are betting and put money down at the
same time. Yet we may call or write our bookies and say we bet $50 on
Stowaway to win. If our credit is good with the bookie, the oral or written
speech alone is sufficient to perform the act.159 Conversely, we may bet$5 on red 21 at the gaming table by putting money down in a certain
place at a certain time. In order for words alone to accomplish the act of
which the verb is the name, there has to be a lot of stage setting or shared
conventions of a very particular sort. Our most general shared conven-
tions, which give words meaning, will not be sufficient here. This context
operates to make performative uses of the verb effective for the act, and
they are determinative of whether there is such an act. Saying "I bet $5
I can beat you to the corner" while showing a $5 bill is not effective to
bet if I am speaking to a dog, any more than placing $5 on the dresser
at night results in a bet, because that is not how we bet. Within these
convention-contexts, the word-elements of the act can drop out entirely
for some, but not all, of the performative verbs. The more highly parti-
16 Did you think you were merely "holding your place" in the unfamiliar
menu text?
151 Notice that this is exactly opposite to how we reach a hand out to an dog
or a strange or injured animal; here, showing a palm (especially with stiff fingersheld together) leads to bites because showing palms in this fashion to animals
universally is a threatening gesture, particularly if we are reaching straight-on
for the animal's head.
1-8 J. AUSTIN, supra note 24, at 37. He is speaking particularly of christenings.To this point, my account of these speech acts essentially is his. From here on,he probably would not agree with what I say because my view is highly contro-
versial or, as some people would have it, wrong. I do, however, borrow his notion
of "accepted conventional procedures" but expand upon it greatly.
"I There are consequences to this act, of course. If Stowaway does not win,I must pay my bookie $50. If Stowaway does win, my bookie must pay me. Thisis just like a judge's saying, "I sentence you to 20 years." There are cuffs to be
snapped, cells to be locked, entries in records to be made as consequences of thejudge's speech act. But none is requisite to performing the speech act itself. If,
on the other hand, our credit with the bookie is not good, a telephone call alone
will not result in a bet.
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cularized the potentially performative speech act, the greater the need
not only for words but for particular words, usually for performative uses
of the verb for which the verb is the name. At the other end of the
spectrum, the more general the act the less the need for any words at all
because the potential speech act verb is so nonspecific that our shared
conventions can become clearly what is determinative of the accomplish-
ment of the act.
For example, to propose that the city council adopt this budget, instead
of merely considering or studying it, I need to say somewhere and some-
how that this is the proposal. One of the least ambiguous ways to do that
is for me to say "I propose the council adopt this budget." To christen, I
need to say "I christen" or "I name;" nothing else will do except some
locution that includes some form of the words "christen" or "name" or, at
least, some words (such as "Henceforth you shall be known as 'Mary' ").
Yet we may question with a rising inflection on our words or command
with a very emphatic tone on our words without saying "I question" or
"I order," and we may question or deny or assent without words from
ourselves at all: raise an eyebrow, shake our heads, nod our heads. The
reason these body languages are effective as complete replacements for
oral or written words is that our shared conventions so make them.
Where along the spectrum a potentially performative speech act falls
- from no words at all to words-plus-particular-nonword-behavior to
only-these-particular-words-are-sufficient - depends on our shared con-
ventions. If we were Moslems, a husband could divorce a wife by saying
"I repudiate you" three times. If we were a dueling society, one person
could challenge another to a duel by slapping the other in a highly cer-
emonial way without words at all. Or we might make saying "I insult
you" or "I slap you on the face," without accompanying gestures such as
spitting or making hand contact, performatively operative. This would
be to substitute one ceremony for another. Again, then, what makes
Allied's beginning the installation of the equipment at Ford's plant a
promise to indemnify Ford for acts of negligence by either Allied's or
Ford's employees is that there was a highly particularized and specific
background between them that functioned locally the way our standard
conventional procedures function nationally. This very same ordinary-
language basis marks the distinction between the Court's two most fa-
mous "symbolic speech" cases, as well as some related cases.
C. When Ordinary-Language Theory Gives Out: "Speech"
When Mary Beth Tinker wore a black armband to school one day to
protest the Vietnam war, the school sent her home as punishment; and
the Court held that this violated her first amendment rights.160 But when
David Paul O'Brien burned his draft card to protest the Viet Nam war
and was convicted for violating a federal statute, the Court held that this
did not violate his first amendment rights. 161 There are a lot of ways to
160 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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distinguish the two cases, of course. We could note, for example, that his
case came to the Court earlier than hers or we could note the gender
difference, and we then could go on to draw political or social inferences.
The true differences between the cases, however, is that her act was a
speech act within the meaning of associated ordinary language words
("speech," "speak," "say"), whereas his was not. That is, we would say she
said something by wearing the armband, but we would not say he said
something by burning his draft card.
In our society, we recognize wearing a black armband just above the
left elbow as signalling grief. It says, "Someone I know has died." It is
akin to the German's hand signal that says someone "has a bird in his
head" (meaning he is crazy) or the Italian's hand signal that says a
husband has been cuckolded, or our most prosaic flipping-the-bird signal.
This last signal, raised in the faces of the local draft board or to an army
recruiting team during the 1960's says, exactly as plainly as does Paul
Robert Cohen's lettered jacket,'162 what many people thought about the
draft or about the war. It, however, usually is more purely emotive and
less clearly truth-functional than are the German's and Italian's signals.
The German says this person is crazy, and the Italian says the husband
is cuckolded; but our finger signal does not truth-functionally say the
draft is fucked. What the German and Italian say may be true or may
be false; not so, usually, with our sign. (Cohen's jacket, however, did
convey a truth-functional message, and I return to that point later.)
We understand the black armband wearing to say "I am mourning,"
"Someone I cared for has died," and so forth, and these are truth-functional
statements, even if there are also emotive overtones. By donning the
armband in the turbulent years of the Viet Nam war, in a community in
which people have discussed this very act as a method of protesting the
war, Tinker makes a more particularized statement than we normally do
in wearing black armbands. The context in which she acts disambiguates
her statement, crystallizes it, until what she does is this speech. But the
general conventional background about wearing armbands already
makes wearing one some speech.
Compare this to O'Brien's act. We have no convention for making the
burning of a piece of paper a speech act of any sort, except for such legal
conventions as revoking a will by intentional burning.163 Ordinary lan-
guage speakers would therefore say he did not say anything by burning
his card. There was a lot of talk among the group in whose midst he
burned the card, of course; and that talk was like the talk Tinker and
her community engaged in before the armband wearing. In both groups,
they all said they were doing these acts in order to protest the war and
162 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). ("Fuck the Draft" on back of hisjacket, which he wore to the courthouse to protest the war; convicting him of
"willfully disturb[ing] the peace ... by ... offensive conduct" violates his first
amendment rights).
1'3This is only a legal convention, not a "community convention" at all, in
the same sense that "legal convention" merely is legal short-talk for distinguish-
ing between intentional and accidental destructions of a copy of a will.
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the draft. In Tinker's case that conversation turned her speech into par-
ticular speech, but our shared conventions already underlay the existence
of some speech in armband wearing.
In O'Brien's case, the very same kind of conversation could work to
disambiguate his card burning to particular war/draft protest speech if
and only if our shared conventions already made intentional burnings of
papers some speech. We have no such convention in our community, and
a sub-group of the community (the rally group) cannot create such an
understanding instanter that binds the rest of us. Compare, then, the
sub-group of Allied and Ford and their special, shared understanding.i6
We as a society have no quarrel with sub-groups of whatever size working
out shared understandings and conventions that bind only them.
65
In the absence of a shared conventional procedure for making burning
his draft card into some speech, O'Brien alternately needed a shared
conventional understanding about the meaning of the draft card. He did
not have that from us either. Had he, however, altered or burned an
American flag (cf. perhaps a Soviet flag, a Girl Scout flag), his intentional
burning or other manipulation of the flag would be speech because of our
shared understanding about the meaning of this flag.
66
With Cohen's jacket, of course, there was no similar problem at all on
either side because his jacket had words we all give meaning through
our shared understanding. He did not put "X rotsexl Ts" on the back of
his jacket and then claim these symbols expressed his protest against the
war and the draft. Had he so done and claimed, we would say he had said
1 See § III. B., supra.
165Actually, of course, one of our conventions also functions in the back-
ground of Allied and Ford's understanding. Our view is that if you act to do part
of what you and I have talked about as a "package deal" you imply you accept
the entire deal because I did not agree to give you the right unilaterally to break
the package up and take only those parts you want. This may sound like "Law,"
but it is not. The next time a friend suggests that she will do x if you will do y
and z, try making a moral collection on x by doing only y in a circumstance in
which there was no reason for you to do y unless you were intending to be taken
to trigger her doing of x. But, as she said, her trigger-point is y and z, not y alone.
'- See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (conviction for affixing
peace symbol to American flag violates first amendment); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931) (statute prohibiting displaying any flag in "opposition to
organized government" is unconstitutional; flag flown here was a red flag). The
Court's statement in Spence, 418 U.S. at 409, that "governments constitutionally
may forbid anyone from mishandling in any manner a flag that is 
public property"
(emphasis added) is not contrary. The Court's speculations in Spence, 418 U.S.
at 412-15, on governments' interests in preserving a national symbol by prohib-
iting destruction or mutilation of an individual's own American flag, however,
indicates the Court might have a difficult time deciding the question of validity;
but the Court has no doubt that such burning or mutilation itself is speech. In
Stromberg, of course, the statute itself announced the community understanding.
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the Court overturned a conviction
under a statute that prohibited mutilation or destruction of a flag or "cast[ing]
contempt ... by words" on grounds that the last clause was unconstitutional,
without deciding whether the defendant's burning of the flag would be punishable,
because the officer's testimony that he heard the defendant's words ("We don't
need no damn flag") was enough for the Court to presume the defendant was
arrested and convicted for his words alone.
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nothing at all, let alone anything of that kind. When he puts "Fuck the
Draft" on the back of his jacket, we know this is English. Our conventions
make it speech. When he says, during the turbulent years of the war in
Vietnam, he is wearing that sentence to protest the war and the draft,
to say that he protests the war and the draft, we do not respond by saying
"No, you said nothing at all." Rather our shared understandings are
exactly that these words in this order form an English-language sentence
and that we sometimes use "fuck" to express displeasure, to say that we
are displeased, but put in scurrilous terminology. In Cohen's case, wearing
the sentence said more; he, like Tinker said, "The war is wrong" or "We
should get out of Vietnam" and so on. This is truth-functional proposi-
tional political and moral expression, not merely emotive discourse, aris-
ing in the political upheaval of the 1960's.
In short, then, the way ordinary language users talk in ordinary lan-
guage about these incidents undergirds and justifies and dictates, with
one exception, the Court's decisions in these cases. The exception is the
so-called "symbolic speech" doctrine, which is no doctrine at all for two
reasons: All speech is symbolic, i.e., is by way of symbols of one sort or
another - usually by words, but sometimes by words and other signs,
and sometimes by nonword acts alone (e.g., nodding heads). Moreover,
all speech involves conduct or action of one sort or another - it always
involves at a minimum either vocal-cord/tongue-mouth movements or
finger-writing or finger-signing movements or handing written materials
to someone, and so on; or else the speech requires a shared understanding
that particular movements of the body (nod head) or manipulation of
symbols, about which society already has a shared understanding of the
meaning of the symbol (the American flag), are modes of expressing our
propositional thoughts. Similarly, marching in a group of demonstrators
is ordinary-language speech in at least the sense that ordinary speakers
will say the marchers are saying something by marching. Sleeping in a
park is not, and the difference is exactly one of shared notions about how
to express propositional attitudes without using words, i.e., what we
would say about these two positionings of our bodies. 167
The "symbolic speech" doctrine is deep-seated philosophical nonsense
from the vantage of the nature of ordinary language's "speech" itself. But
neither that nor any of the other points I have sketched means the Court
needs to engage in either philosophy of language or linguistics. Indeed,
to believe I have suggested or implied such a view here is entirely to miss
my point. The Court arrived at the proper results in each of these cases
167 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (fed-
eral ban on camping in park does not violate first amendment), thus reaches the
right result but could have used an easier ground of no-speech. One reason theCourt did not is that it is fond of the "symbolic speech" doctrine, and scholarshave not done their jobs in disabusing the Court and each other of this doctrine.Another reason the Court did not use a no-speech approach was that the Courtknew how to apply the rest of the tests of O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, to reach the
same no-infirmity result. The interesting questions for scholars, then, are whetherthe O'Brien protection analyses ever can lead to a result of constitutional-infirmity
when there is no speech and whether the Court should avoid the no-speech anal-
yses.
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and gave reasons that were all-but-exactly the right ones to give, not
because the Court is accomplished in philosophy or political theory or
socio-psycho linguistics, but because the Court is made up of men and
women who speak ordinary English, which already embodies these very
distinctions on the basis of our shared understandings and vice versa.
Relatedly, every now and then I meet someone who insists that "the
freedom of speech" is a technical language phrase because "speech" is a
technical term under the Court's interpretation in that the Court applies
the first amendment to nonoral, i.e., written, uses of language. These
people imagine that the ordinary language meaning of "speech" is limited
to oral communications from the stump, so to speak, and they point to
"Did you read the President's speech" as being elliptical for "Did you read
the text of the President's speech." We indeed do have both locutions, and
the former may well be the elliptical form of the latter; but that does not
prove their point. Nor does the pattern of the following exchange: I ask,
"Did you speak to her?" You answer, "No, but I left her a note." The reason
examples such as these (and they can be multiplied) do not establish that
the Court's use of "speech" is a technical term in covering nonoral lin-
guistic behavior is exactly the same sort of reason the Court's use of
"speech" covers certain nonword behaviors that say something. This rea-
son is that ordinary English speakers use the words "say," "speak" and
"speech" both broadly and narrowly, i.e., both as generic words and as
particular-instance words, just as we similarly use "chicken" as a generic
word and as a particular-instance word.'6
Nor is the Court's use deviant in the other direction, although this is
decidedly harder to see, in failing to count certain speech acts as speech
for first amendment purposes. Perjury, for example, and solicitation for
sex are not first amendment speech. Solicitation for votes is, but not
because of the speech act. Speech acts of the performative verb sort - "I
promise," "I christen," etc. - are not first amendment speech because
they are not speech but acts in the sense that the way to do these acts is
to use words. Just as the only way to shoot someone is to shoot him or
her, the only way to perjure is to lie under oath; the performative verb
here is "I swear" and the oath is "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth." We give that oath in circumstances in which all
we can do is speak out loud or hold our tongues. We are not even able to
use head nods or head shakes, because our questioner will say, "Answer
the question, please, out loud so that the court reporter and the jury may
hear it." This is not speech, but an act done through words.
169
I have no doubt, of course, that if a court were required to rule on a
first amendment freedom of speech challenge to a perjury prosecution,
the court would reject the first amendment challenge by saying that
provision of the Constitution protects truth; that falsity receives protec-
168 See § I. C., supra.
'6 This is far from being Emerson's speech/conduct distinction, both in basis
and in method, although it goes to one of his purposes, viz., to make plain that
the first amendment is not about what glue carpenters use to join surfaces or
about carpenters using glue to join surfaces.
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tion only insofar as that is necessary in order to give breathing room for
truthful speech and to avoid a chilling effect on truthful speech; and that
the deliberate, knowing, injurious making of false statements under oath
is not protected under "the freedom of speech.."170 But just as beating
someone over the head with a hammer is not speech, we sometimes use
certain words in certain ways to do, instead of using words to describe,
ask, or say. I probably more safely would put my claim about performative
verb speech acts by saying that, because in ordinary English they are
different from other speech acts, i.e., are a special case differing from our
other uses of words, they equally may be treated as a special case under
"speech" in the first amendment.
But consider when we say, "She said she promised that p" instead of
"She promised that p." We use the latter more naturally to report her
speech act, and we reserve the former for occasions when we wish to cast
doubt on her sincerity or to clarify what her words were without departing
from indirect-quotation usages. I ask, "What did she do while I was away?"
when I have no hint of her acts. If she said "I promise I will pay you" to
Peter, you will report by saying "She promised to pay Peter;" but if she
said "The governor may run a favorite-son campaign," you will report by
saying "She said the governor will run a favorite-son campaign." In the
latter case, you also may say, "She didn't do anything; she just talked
about the governor's running a favorite-son campaign." But in the former
case, no one would say, "She didn't do anything; she just promised Peter
she would pay him."'171
Of course, perhaps my discussion from my perjury point to here is
wrong. My ear for ordinary English already may have been bent by the
law's view; that performative verbs for committing perjury, for ordering,
promising, betting, etc. do not raise a first amendment speech issue on
their own and that, if there is one, it arises from the nominalized sentence
or propositional content embedded behind the performative verb.172 If that
is true, then scholars who say the Court's use of "speech" in first amend-
ment analysis picks up some, but not all, of what the ordinary English
170 What the court should say, of course, is that perjury is not speech, rather
than that it is not protected speech.
171 1 am contrasting two of her speech acts and the two reporting locutions;
note, then, the similarity between "She promised to pay Peter" and "She kicked
the dog."
172 To carry out the details of my claim about performative uses of perfor-
mative verbs I would need to do some trimming on the membership of that
category. Austin, for example, once identified "I assert that p" and "I state thatp" as performative verb speech acts, yet they obviously differ significantly from
"I promise that p." They are, to speak loosely, more like "I say that p." That is,they may be put in front of virtually anything we utter or write. They also raise
some of the same problems that the predicates ".... is true" and ". . . is false"
raise. See, e.g., Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations
of Semantics, 4 J. PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 341 (1944), reprinted in READ-
INGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (H. Feigl & W. Sellars eds. 1949) at 52 ("... istrue" as a metalinguistic predicate of sentences); Strawson, Truth, 9 ANALYSIS(1949), reprinted in E. NAGEL & R. BRANDT, MEANINGAND KNOWLEDGE 160 (1965)(pe rformative theory of ". . . is true").
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word "speech" covers are right,173 although for different reasons than they
may believe. In any event, it allows me to enter, by the backdoor, the
other point I wish to make about the Court's use of "speech." Sometimes
ordinary language, taken in the broad sense of how we talk about things,
gives out as a source of information about what we think about them or
what they are. When the Court faces a first amendment issue under "the
freedom of speech" in these circumstances, the Court is at the cutting-
edge of our language and of our societal beliefs.
Here the Court must rely on and must construct a theory in interpreting
"the freedom of speech" and must treat the first amendment as one of our
prescriptive institutions that is to function as one of the foundations of
our free society. The Court uses a number of different theories, drawing
strands from each: Mill's marketplace of ideas,
174 Meiklejohn's informed
electorate, 175 Rawl's veil-of-ignorance contract,'
1 76 Scanlon's personal au-
tonomy,' 77 Schauer's governmental ineptness,
178 and so on. When the
Court is successful in fulfilling its role as prescriptive interpreter, society
will follow to where the Court is leading by internalizing the values the
Court identifies under the first amendment and the uses to which the
Further refinements would be necessary to deal with "I solicit," as in "I solicit
you for sex" and "I solicit your vote." Austin's double-checking "hereby" does not
sound right to my ear with "solicit," and I cannot "hear" speakers using "I solicit
your vote for candidate Smith" - rather, here I hear "I am soliciting votes for
candidate Smith; may we count on yours?" That is, "I solicit" from non-Smith
persons sounds to my ear like canvassing voters and as not being noncontinuous.
But Smith may stand on the stump and may say, "I solicit your votes in next
Tuesday's election." Or so Sandy Levinson recently suggested to me in conver-
sation. I never have heard that use of "solicit" from a politician; what I have
heard them say using "solicit" is, "I am here to solicit your votes" or "I am soliciting
votes," etc. Similarly, what I hear people saying is, "I would like to solicit a favor
from you," not "I hereby solicit a favor from you." Relatedly, a prostitute's solic-
itation and solicitation of a prostitute "sounds" to me in someone's saying "I am
soliciting you for sex," and not in "I hereby solicit you for sex," assuming "solicit"
"sounds" in either locution. (That is, both of these locutions strike my ear as
nonnatural.) As far as I can hear, "solicit" does not as a matter of fact function
performatively the way "promise," "christen," "order," etc. do. That is, it could
have, but it does not: We do not use it performatively.
In short, if Sandy Levinson is correct in claiming "solicit" does have a perfor-
mative use of the sort that "promise" does, at least one of the performative verb
speech acts, which are "doings" via words and not speech in ordinary English
according to my view, is speech under the first amendment, albeit perhaps not
always protected. In that event, the Court's use of "speech" captures some, but
not all, of ordinary language "speech" in another sense than the one I discuss for
"obscenity" in the text following this note, for I will have taken too seriously the
title of Austin's book: "How to do things with words."
173 See, e.g., Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and "Obscenity": An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
174 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
175 A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948), reprinted in part I of his POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1979).
176 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
177 Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204
(1972).
171F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
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Court puts "speech." We have authorized the Court to do this by adopting
the first amendment and creating the Court; and as we internalize the
Court's uses of "speech," we will change our own ordinary uses of "speech."
As long as that happens, we never can be cut off from the language of
the first amendment because we will have the Court's opinion and its
statement of theory for "stretching" "speech" to bide us over until we can
internalize the cutting-edge use. Having to give an explanation that will
hold up in the light of day in turn constrains the Court from jumping too
far ahead of the rest of us.
The Court is at a cutting-edge point on "obscenity," for example. Ob-
scene books and obscene nonmime plays involve words. Obscene movies
often do involve words, but obviously need not, any more than artist's
drawings need to involve words. The Court says obscenity is not first
amendment speech,179 and that looks counter-intuitive. That is, it looks
contrary to the ordinary language word "speech" insofar as the Court is
saying, for example, a book does not qualify under "speech" of the first
amendment. To say this of artist's drawings is not similarly counter-
intuitive, and it is even less counter-intuitive to deny speech status to
sexual acts performed at high noon in Times Square. In saying obscenity
is not speech under "the freedom of speech" and including books and
nonmime plays and talking pictures along with artist's drawings when
these all have certain characteristics in common with sexual acts in Times
Square, the Court is building a theoretical stretch into "speech" for "the
freedom of speech" and shaping the ordinary language words "obscenity"
and "obscene." These theoretical stretches are difficult ones because sex-
ual acts between human beings are not themselves obscene, and this
means describing what the "certain characteristics in common" are is
difficult.
A society that does not have a written first amendment stated in terms
of "the freedom of speech" does not have to resolve the exact contours of
meaning for "obscene" or "obscenity" with special reference to "speech."
Our society does, however; and some of the difficulties of resolution are
compounded by mass marketing of talking pictures. Over time, the
Court's resolutions will affect the ways all of us talk about obscenity and
speech and will affect our views of a just and free society. Contracts courts
describe where we already are, but free-speech courts sometimes tell us
where we are going. The former move with us and the way we talk in
ordinary ways, but we sometimes move with the latter and learn to talk
in new ordinary ways.
D. Speaking Entre Nous: Lawyers and Law Professors
None of my arguments tell us how lawyers talk with each other about
the law when clients are not around, nor how they may need to talk in
179 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
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that circumstance. If technical languages are useful in the sciences to
enable clearer and faster communication from scientist to scientist and
technical uses are similarly useful for trades people, lawyers have no less
need for clarity and for efficiently quick modes of communicating with
one another.
Lawyers certainly may and do make different-deployment and one-
among-many-meanings technical uses of ordinary English. This kind of
short or exact speaking goes with the territory of any fairly regular, fairly
compartmented discipline, occupation, or activity. This, of course, does
not get lawyers into speaking a technical language because these terms
are ordinary English put to technical uses. The question is whether among
themselves lawyers use technical terms in some more interesting sense.
Do lawyers, speaking among themselves, have terms that are completely
cut off from English and that obtain their meaning from theory; or terms
that have meanings only part of which are marginally related to same-
sounding, same-looking ordinary English words and that are central
terms in a theory; or terms that are fixed to one among many ordinary
language meanings but also are theoretical terms? Due process constrains
the language of the law and constrains the language of lawyers in court,
but due process does not constrain the language of lawyers among them-
selves away from clients and juries. Do they then have a technical lan-
guage?
No. They do have jargon and argot. Some of these modes of short-talking
are specific to a particular law firm or to divisions in the firm to the point
that they almost are not even remotely English, but some kind of code.
When lawyers go outside those groups and forget to switch out of code or
short-talk, they sound inarticulate to the rest of us or, worse, incompre-
hensible. Usually someone in the group asks these lawyers to repeat
themselves; and, as the joke's mark hits home, the smart ones then switch
into English, and the others repeat themselves. Sometimes, of course,
lawyers refuse to use ordinary English in order to impress or intimidate.
That often backfires. Aside from whether some lawyers are making the
rest of the profession look bad by being inarticulate or intimidating, I
see no reason to worry about their jargon or argot or codes.
There is reason, however, to be concerned about some occasions of using
ordinary English words with a technical use. Lawyers do not run into
trouble talking among themselves using "consideration," for example;
nor do they run into trouble using it with clients or before juries as long
as they remember somewhere along the line to say that what they are
talking about is bargained exchange. Even if they do not remember,
probably nothing untoward happens because most ordinary-English
speakers are familiar with this technical use of "consideration." But law-
yers sometimes do worse than this. Not long ago, in a state that shall go
unnamed, a jury-instruction-guidelines panel considered writing an in-
struction for the jury to answer "Is there consideration for the contract,"
as part of determining contract-formation issues. What, exactly, would a
jury do with an instruction of this sort stated in just these words? The
panel seems to me to have confused a legal-conclusion label that sum-
marizes certain findings of facts with a factual finding, and I suspect the
1989]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 335 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
culprit here is that not enough of lawyers' audiences make lawyers speak
plainly and drop road signs for their technical uses, until lawyers forget
their technical use is technical.
Ordinary people who do not speak up and force candor from lawyers
are at their mercy. With courts the matter is a bit otherwise because
there are scholars who make their livings out of analyzing courts' opinions
and assessing what the courts said or should have said. And, of course,
these same scholars do the same to the analyses of other scholars. If
lawyers make their livings on words, legal scholars make their livings
on other people's words.
Scholars have a role to play, however, that is as important as the roles
of lawyers for clients and judges for parties. For in critically analyzing
and theorizing about the law, decided and yet-to-come, scholars help
courts bridge the gap when settled conventions and ordinary language
give out. Not only are judges not philosopher kings, they also are not
psychologists, sociologists, engineers, linguists and so on. Even if they
had the inclination, they do not have the luxury of time for the reflective
study and thought that goes into theory-construction. When judges con-
struct theories, then, they do not do so out of the air, but out of articles
and books, as well as out of what they already know because they have
grown up in our society. If scholars fail to do the spade work in preparation
for the difficult issues courts will face or if they fail to be intellectually
honest, the law may end up taking a blind turn. That may be more
dangerous to freedom than a technical language of the law that only
lawyers can speak.
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